














Abstract This study attempts to determine some of the key drivers in stock growth of BAT, IMB, JTI 
and PMI (“Big Tobacco”) which have seen strong growth in stock pricing from 2000 to 2016. The study 
uses a combination of financial statements and market related metrics to determine key trends. The 
results show that “Big Tobacco” has increased its share in the global market through acquisitions and 
diversification into the vaping and logistics markets. Share buy backs and increased margins have 
helped offset the decrease in cigarette consumption and have encouraged a bullish view of the 
industry. However, increasing dividend pay-out ratios, a falling cash conversion cycle and an increased 
tax burden suggest future difficulties. The market continues to price growth into “Big Tobacco” stocks, 
and while risk is low in the industry the same level of growth cannot be expected in the future without 
some changes in the sector. Further consolidation of the industry could provide more opportunity for 
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From 2000, a $1 investment in “Big Tobacco” offered a 900% return if one held the stock for just 16 
years. This paper aims to identify some key trends in the corporate strategy of “Big Tobacco”, and 
whether or not tobacco growth is likely to continue to be as robust in the future. It examines some of 
the trends that have contributed to the industry’s success over those 16 years. The findings are based 
on an analysis of the four major tobacco companies: British American Tobacco (BAT), Imperial Brands 
(IMB), formerly Imperial Tobacco, Japan International Tobacco (JTI) and Philip Morris International 
(PM). These will be referred to collectively as the “big 4” companies or as “Big Tobacco”. The first part 
of the paper investigates official press releases and financial reports emanating directly from “Big 
Tobacco”. Corporate acquisitions are compiled and analysed as are changes in financial statements 
over the period. This includes changes in leverage, margins and dividend analysis. The second part of 
the paper deals with market-related ratios and methods of analysis. Finally, the study offers its own 
estimate of the true share price, and discusses price volatility.  
Chapter 1: Tobacco history and company formation 
The origins of the two types of tobacco plant—Nicotiana tabacum and Nicotiana rustica—date back 
18 000 years. They originally grew in areas of Peru/Ecuador. Although other plants found there (such 
as tomatoes, potatoes, maize and cocoa beans) may have been considered more important as 
foodstuffs, tobacco began to be cultivated as early as 5000–3000BC (Musk & De Klerk, 2003). The 
plants grew throughout the Americas, but it was Christopher Columbus who brought back stories of 
tobacco smoking to Europe after 1492. Tobacco reached Europe in 1558, and subsequently spread to 
the rest of the world via colonial expansion (Goodman, 2005). By 1560 it was being used in central 
Africa, after being brought through the east coast by the Portuguese and Spanish. Subsequently it 
spread to China and Japan, and by the 17th century, manufactured tobacco had entered Russian and 
Indian territory (Brandt, 2007).   
Tobacco usage changed as its practice spread globally. In earlier times, snuffing was the most 
prevalent usage, with snuffing instruments being some of the oldest tobacco-related artefacts found. 
The plant was not only sniffed, it was originally chewed, eaten, mixed with water and used in medicinal 
practices as an analgesic or for its antiseptic properties. Similarly, in early religious ceremonies, it was 
offered to the gods, having seemingly mystical connotations. The most long-lasting use, however, of 
tobacco has been smoking, either rolled up in cigar form or inhaled in a pipe. (Musk & De Klerk, 2003) 
While tobacco growth continued to increase globally, some countries regarded tobacco as a source of 
tax or revenue during the late 1800s. Both Japan and China pursued a policy of monopolisation of the 
tobacco industry during this period. China demands special attention here, given its historically high 
rate of tobacco use and population size (Mackay, 1996). Mackay (1996) points out that James Duke, 
the entrepreneur who started what is now British American Tobacco, recognised the considerable gap 
in the Chinese market. The creation of the cigarette machine allowed BAT to enter the Chinese market 
with force. By 1920, BAT had a full advertising campaign in China, allowing it to increase its market 
share. Annual cigarette consumption increased from a negligible level to around 100 billion sticks 
(Mackay, 1996). BAT sales accounted for 67% of the Chinese market, which represented 40% of BAT’s 
total volume (Mackay, 1996). BAT was forced out of the Chinese market in 1952 with China’s shift to 
communism. Although BAT has since returned to the Chinese market, one of the world’s largest 
tobacco companies, China Tobacco (CNTC), has been excluded from this study. China Tobacco has a 
virtual monopoly in China, which accounts for 30% of total global cigarette consumption. In order to 
avoid price distortions and other market manipulations, it seems wiser to focus on the free-market 
operations in which the other four companies engage.  
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In the rest of the world, the 1900s showed promising gains for the four major companies as tobacco 
consumption rose. Burns (1997) outlines some key points that have defined tobacco-related products, 
showing a strong, exponential increase in tobacco consumption until around 1940, when the per 
capita consumption stabilised. Around 1965, tobacco consumption began to decrease. Although Burns 
(1997) deals specifically with the U.S, its findings may be used as a relatively accurate proxy for global 
consumption. The exception is outlined by both Musk (2003) and Makay (1996), who find that 
prevalence is in fact growing in developing countries. They argue that while tobacco as a consumer 
product may have some benefits, it is ultimately detrimental to countries whose politicians choose 
not to actively fight the spread of tobacco. Makay (1996) goes on to list six possible reasons for 
increased tobacco use in the developing world:  
1. An increase in the absolute population of developing countries; 
2. An increase in smoking prevalence due to an increase in affluence among the better educated; 
3. A likely increase in prevalence amongst women because of extensive marketing aimed at 
countering social taboos; 
4. Ignorance of health risks; 
5. The lack of funding to control and implement countermeasures;  
6. Extensive marketing by well-funded multinationals. 
Given that the anti-tobacco movement was first successful at reducing tobacco consumption in the 
developed world, Musk (2003) outlines some of the key areas that were fundamental to lowering 
tobacco prevalence. The areas are:  
1. Banning tobacco promotion; 
2. Discouraging smoking among the young; 
3. Effective, rotating health warnings (and, more recently, brand removal); 
4. Limits on harmful substances permitted in cigarettes; 
5. Limits on other products (e.g. smokeless tobacco) as well as cigarettes;  
6. Creation of smoke-free areas; 
7. The increase of taxes on all tobacco-related products.  
 
The Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC), which aimed to continue decreasing smoking 
prevalence worldwide, was first adopted at the World Health Assembly in 2003. It has since been 
signed by 180 countries. The FCTC is the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) approach to countering 
the tobacco epidemic by providing a framework for tobacco control measures to be implemented. 
These are similar to the key areas listed above. The FCTC provides universal guidelines to tackle each 
aspect of tobacco prevalence. Laungesen (1992), Blecher (2008), Altman (1996), and Moodie (2013) 
each find that measures to counter advertising and brand recognition are effective in decreasing 
smoking prevalence. The tobacco sector does not self-regulate, and public-private partnerships have 
not been effective at decreasing tobacco prevalence. The FCTC is able to help guide policy in this 
regard. Given these anti-tobacco measures, one would expect to see a decrease in income and the 
bottom line of any or all of the big four tobacco companies. 
However, the tobacco companies have not been passive. During the period of active opposition, “Big 
Tobacco” has used several strategies to counter the anti-tobacco movements. Assunta (2004) finds 
that when presented with an outright advertising ban, tobacco companies have shifted from direct to 
indirect advertising and maintained a strong presence in the market. Assunta (2004) also finds that 
even as late as the 1990s, despite having been banned from advertising on mass-media, tobacco 
companies were top advertisers throughout the country, albeit indirectly. Brownell (2009) argues that 
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the tobacco industry focused on disseminating research that instilled doubt, denying that their 
products were addictive or could cause any sort of harm. Like Moodie (2013), Brownell shows that 
promises of self-regulation were empty. The most obvious case occurred in 1954, when the tobacco 
industry issued a ‘Frank-Statement to Cigarette Smokers’, a message assuring the public that the 
industry worked in their best interests.  
Brandt (2012) argues that the industry has continued to deny and subvert. By sponsoring and 
promoting scientists who expressed criticism of the scientific community’s findings at the time, the 
industry could prolong its success. Carrying this even further, they gave money through university-
based grants, which encouraged cooperation with particular views while remaining apparently 
independent. The second part of this process involved recruiting newspapers and magazines to 
support their ideas. Chapman (2003) outlines three main strategies that were used to delay the 
implementation of health warnings on cigarette packs in Australia. They were:  
1. Making submissions to government;  
2. Privately influencing politicians and the media;  
3. Commissioning research.  
Each of the above-mentioned strategies was particularly successful, and Chapman (2003) outlines the 
counter-strategies that other countries should use to eliminate the delay.  
Finally, Landman(2002) points out that although the tobacco industry has aggressively promoted its 
youth smoking education and prevention programmes, these may have had contrary effects to those 
intended. Programmes that began in the 1980s in the U.S have spread to all corners of the world, with 
a minimum of 70 countries targeted at the beginning of the 2000s. Landman(2002) finds that tobacco 
industry programmes are less convincing than those funded by public health institutes, and that they 
also fail to mention any of the adverse health effects of tobacco use. These tactics allow the tobacco 
firms to pay less tax and to avoid marketing restrictions, while spreading their brands worldwide. 
Landman (2002) argues that smoking prevention programmes do more harm than good if they are 
funded by the tobacco industry itself.  
Tobacco use has evolved over time, and its detrimental health effects have been thoroughly 
researched. With a strong and well-established anti-tobacco movement and a growing number of 
measures being taken to prevent the increase of smoking prevalence, one would expect that the big 
four tobacco firms would see a fall in revenue, and in turn of shareholder value and net profit. 
However, this has not happened. Neither health care education nor the development of government 
policy has slowed revenue growth or positive stock return. This paper will consider why this is the 









Chapter 2: History of “Big Tobacco” 
This section aims to describe how each of “Big Tobacco” firms were formed, and highlight some of 
the similarities (and differences) over the past 100 years. Firstly, each of “Big Tobacco” has followed 
the growth curve of tobacco alluded to in chapter 1. Each has seen significant gains in the first part 
of the 1900s due to the success of cigarette sales. Then, “Big Tobacco” uses their stable income to 
diversify into other industries, buying a range of businesses during the 1950 – 1970s. This was not 
limited to food, beverage and pharmaceutical companies. The trend following the expansion was 
that of contraction – selling off the majority of non-tobacco companies. Leading up to the 2000s, we 
find that “Big Tobacco” looked to establish its international roots.  
British American Tobacco (BAT) 
In the United States, although the manufacturing of cigarettes continued throughout the U.S Civil War, 
it was not until 1869 that hand-rolled cigarettes began to gain popularity. The U.S firm F.S Kinney was 
one of the first to introduce American workers to hand-rolling by bringing in European veteran hand 
rollers. With increasing returns to scale, new tobacco blends and a focus on bright leaf (Flue Cured) 
tobacco1, the cigarette slowly gained popularity on the east coast of the U.S.A., as a cheaper 
alternative to other more established brands (Cox, 2000). 
Ten years later, W. Duke & Sons, a small firm based in Durham, North Carolina began producing 
cigarettes. Previously, they had focused on chewing and smoking tobacco. At the time, it made little 
sense to expand into a production method that was labour intensive, especially at higher volumes. 
James Buchanan Duke, however, who took over the company from his father, aimed to expand the 
company in areas other than its original focus. He first challenged his well-established competitor, Bull 
Durham. No one at the time anticipated that his small company would not only surpass its city rivals, 
but eventually become the international conglomerate that it is today (Cox, 2000). 
Taking advantage of strikes in New York, Duke enticed workers to move to Durham by offering them 
the highest wages in the industry and promising that moving expenses would be covered. By 1885, W. 
Duke & & Sons had 700 employees—increased from ten when Duke took over the company.  
Industry growth had also been impressive. Duke was able to outperform his competitors because of 
the invention of the cigarette-rolling machine by James Bonsack in 1885, as normal production 
methods would not have allowed him to undercut his competitors without damaging his own profits. 
(Cox, 2000) 
At the time, the four big cigarette companies owned roughly 80% of production for the U.S market. 
Fearing a drop in demand if cigarettes were not hand-rolled, Duke’s competitors were slow to adopt 
the technology (Brandt, 2007). The cigarette-rolling machine could produce 200 finely cut cigarettes 
per minute. A hand roller would take about an hour to produce the same number. Not only was the 
speed of production drastically improved, the cost of production was cut almost in half because fewer 
workers were needed. Duke’s early adoption of the machine allowed him to refine the process and 
increase his returns. Finally, Duke guaranteed his success in the cigarette industry by arranging with 
Bonsack for a reduction in price for the machine, securing pricing superiority over his competitors 
(Cox, 2000). 
Duke next sought a more streamlined process and economies of scales in other areas of production. 
He saw the advantage of combining all of the big four companies. In 1890, they were amalgamated as 
the American Tobacco Company. The original four companies, Allen & Ginter, Kinney, W.S Kimball & 
                                                          
1 A milder, lighter and more aromatic, tobacco leaf. 
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Company and Goodwin & Company, all received their share of the stock of the newly-formed company 
(Cox, 2000). With Duke at its helm, the American Tobacco Company soon became known as the 
Tobacco Trust, commanding 90% of the U.S.A cigarette market.  
Looking to expand the Tobacco Trust internationally, Duke travelled to the U.K.. in 1901. After 
purchasing Ogden Limited (a large tobacco firm in the U.K.) the Tobacco Trust could put pressure on 
the newly-formed Imperial Tobacco. Duke moved to merge with Imperial Tobacco soon after and, in 
1902, British American Tobacco was formed. The Tobacco Trust owned two thirds of BAT, and Imperial 
the remainder. Both agreed not to interfere with each other’s domestic markets. (Cox, 2000) 
While an effective monopoly had allowed the Tobacco Trust to prosper, this ended in 1911. The 
company was judged to hinder competition and was ordered to break up into smaller constituents. 
Importantly, however, British American Tobacco and Imperial were exempted from the ruling. The 
Tobacco Trust was forced to sell its share in BAT. Four firms were resulted from the break-up of the 
Tobacco Trust: the American Tobacco Company, Liggett & Myers, R. J. Reynolds, and P. Lorillard. The 
only significant company in the American tobacco industry that was not created from the dissolution 
of the Tobacco Trust was Philip Morris, which will be discussed later.  
BAT continued its growth into international markets throughout the 20th century, purchasing or 
creating subsidiaries in India, Germany, France, Chile, Mexico and other Central American countries. 
By the late 1970s, BAT had diversified into multiple industries. These included paper production, 
cosmetics and food, and it was now listed as ‘BAT Industries’. It was only in 1994 that BAT was able to 
buy itself out, and become a stand-alone tobacco company.  
Since then, BAT has acquired a number of important companies. The purchase of Rothmans 
International in 1999 solidified their return to the American market. Significant purchases in Italy, 
Denmark and the U.S.A. in the first decade of the twenty-first century amounted to over $10 billion. 
The most important of these was the purchase of Brown & Williamson in 2004. BAT gained control of 
42% of Reynolds American (RAI) through this purchase, and it gave BAT further control in the U.S.A.  
The American arms of BAT, Brown & Williamson and RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company, were the second 
and third largest tobacco companies at the time. (BAT, 2017) 
In 2015, RAI purchased Lorillard. This allowed RAI to consolidate its market position in the U.S.A., 
gaining access to Lorillard’s popular menthol cigarette, Newport. Reynolds and Altria went on to sell 
nine out of ten cigarettes in the U.S.A. The purchase was funded by BAT, which contributed $4.7 billion 
of the total cost of $25 billion. This meant that BAT maintained its 42% share of RAI. (BAT, 2017) 
BAT has continued to increase its market share abroad, through increased sales and company 
acquisitions. Its latest acquisition, in January 2017, of the remaining 57.8% of common stock of RAI 
meant that RAI is now a wholly-owned subsidiary of BAT. Valued at $49.4 billion, this will not only be 
BAT’s biggest purchase to date, but also the largest purchase in the industry. Although BAT’s final 
share and cash offer was above asking price, the purchase of RAI is strategic for BAT in two ways. 
Firstly, the U.K.. based company gains access to the American market that they did not have 
previously. Bloomberg estimates that this will now account for around 35% of the group’s revenue. 
Secondly, BAT now has access to Reynolds American’s range of R & D projects. One of their products 
that has gained in popularity over recent years is their alternative to the cigarette, RAI’s Vuse brand. 
The acquisition also secures BAT first place by market capitalization in the tobacco industry, overtaking 
PMI. Currently, Reynolds American operates as the amalgamation of five distinct operating 
companies. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company is currently the second largest tobacco company2 in the 
                                                          
2 Behind Altria. 
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U.S.A., and focuses on the American market. Its popular brands include Newport, Camel, Kent, Palll 
Mall and Lucky Strike. RJ Reynolds’ other divisions cover products such as cigarettes, smokeless 
tobacco and nicotine replacements. Santa Fe Natural Tobacco company has been operating as a 
division of Reynolds since 2002. Its best-known cigarette brand, Natural American Spirit, is sold 
worldwide. In 2015, however, JTI has purchased the right to distribute Natural American Spirit in Asia 
and Europe. Reynolds’ snuff division, the American Snuff Company, was founded in 1900. It is now the 
second largest smokeless tobacco producer in the U.S.A. Grizzly and Kodiak are its more popular 
brands. Niconovum U.S.A. and Niconovum AB are Reynolds American’s division of nicotine 
replacement therapy products in the U.S.A and Sweden, respectively. Founded in 2000, the division, 
under the brand name Zonnic, continues to look for new means of discouraging nicotine cravings. 
Finally, RJ Reynolds Vapour focuses on digital vapour cigarettes. Concentrating on the American 
market, Reynolds Vapour sells its products under the brand name VUSE. When BAT’s purchase of RAI 
is complete, all of RAI’s American market operations will be under BAT’s control (BAT, 2017). 
Today, BAT has over 200 cigarette brands and other tobacco products that are sold worldwide. Their 
focus, however, is on the growth of their Global Driver Brands (GDBs). GDBs consist of the combined 
volume sold of Dunhill, Kent, Lucky Strike, Pall Mall and Rothmans. While BAT’s growth has been in 
conventional tobacco sales, it has also made inroads into the new e-cigarette technology. This is 
further discussed in the following chapter (BAT, 2017). 
Imperial Brands (IMB) 
Imperial’s beginnings date back to 1786, when Wills & Co., a small tobacco shop in Bristol, U.K.. was 
opened. Wills & Co. was not the only small tobacco producer in the area, however, as J. Player & Sons, 
and Ogden’s Liverpool had established themselves in a similar market segment (Imperial Brands, 
2017).  
While each of these companies saw considerable growth, it was only at the start of the 20th century 
that cooperation was required. The American Tobacco Company3 had set aside more than US$30 
million to purchase tobacco companies in the U.K... so as to extend their monopoly outside the U.S.A. 
Duke arrived in the U.K.. in 1901, and famously walked into the Ogden factory in Liverpool and bought 
it on the spot. Although Duke wanted to continue his acquisitions by purchasing J. Player & Sons, he 
was not successful, and Ogden was the only significant successful acquisition he made at that time 
(Imperial Brands, 2017). 
The U.K. companies recognised the threat however – American Tobacco had financial backing to a 
level none of the companies had individually. Thirteen family-run companies opted to amalgamate 
under one name to counter the American Tobacco move in domestic markets. Imperial Tobacco 
Company was formed in 1901, led by Sir William Henry Wills. 
The purchase of Ogden allowed Duke to engage in trade wars with the newly-formed Imperial 
Tobacco. After a year, facing losses and a worsening trade war back in the U.S.A., ATC was compelled 
to negotiate with Imperial Tobacco. The two companies agreed to stay out of each other’s respective 
markets, and Ogden was returned to Imperial. Simultaneously, British American Tobacco was created 
as the U.K. branch of the American Tobacco Company. Up to 1973, Imperial restricted its trade to the 
U.K. and Ireland, while BAT focused on export and duty-free trade, predominantly in Europe. Imperial 
sold its share in BAT in 1980, though some trademarks are still held by BAT outside Europe.  
                                                          
3 Discussed in detail earlier in this chapter. 
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The 1960s and 1970s saw Imperial Tobacco expand its interests beyond tobacco. Golden Wonder—a 
small potato crisps company—was acquired. The company became a leader in the multi-million-pound 
industry. Mardon Packaging was a joint venture between BAT and Imperial, and represented their 
printing and packaging industries. The popular HP Sauce brand was Imperial’s largest acquisition at 
the time, and included its subsidiary Lee Perrins. Acquisitions continued into frozen and tinned foods, 
brewery and alcohol-related industries, and plastic industries. As a result of the diversification, 
Imperial Tobacco became Imperial Group Inc. The group then divided its focus into five divisions: 
Tobacco; Paper and Board; Food; Distributive Trade and General Trade. (Imperial Brands, 2017) 
In 1986, Hanson Trust successfully acquired Imperial Group. The period that followed was one of major 
restructuring and optimisation. A drop in the number of brands offered, managed by 13 new divisions, 
aimed to reduce cost and improve efficiency. When Imperial became independent from Hanson ten 
years later, its productivity had trebled and it had a considerably larger market share.  
From 1997 to 2008, Imperial refocused on tobacco, and spent £17 billion on acquisitions of tobacco, 
or tobacco-related, firms. The company increased its interests in Africa in 2001 when it purchased 
Tobaccor, the second largest manufacturer and distributor of cigarettes in the sub-Saharan region of 
Africa. This was followed in 2002 by the acquisition of Reemtsma. Reemtsma was a company with 
well-established markets in Europe, which complemented Imperial’s strength in the U.K.. (Imperial 
Brands, 2017) 
After 115 years as Imperial Tobacco, the company underwent a name change in 2016, and became 
Imperial Brands. Some drew parallels between the change and that of Altria and Philip Morris (Jarvis, 
2015). Most see the removal of ‘tobacco’ from the company name as opening the door to acquisitions 
outside the tobacco industry.   
From 2013, Imperial began a focus on two distinct markets within the tobacco industry: growth 
markets and return markets. Growth markets are those that the company develops as potentially 
profitable in the future, while return markets maintain their current profitability going forward. 
(Imperial Brands, 2017) 
Growth markets include Russia, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Japan, Taiwan, Iraq & Syria, and 
Sweden & Norway. Return markets are split up into North and South areas respectively. The North 
focuses on the U.K.., Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Australia and the Ukraine. The 
South encompasses Spain, France, Algeria and Morocco.  
Currently, Imperial Brands represents an amalgamation of five distinct brand focus areas in both 
tobacco and non-tobacco industries. In the first place, Imperial Tobacco, the core of subsidiaries that 
both manufacture and market cigarettes, fine cut tobacco, smokeless tobacco, cigars, papers and 
tubes to a variety of markets worldwide. The core of Imperial Tobacco’s business, however, is in 
Europe. Key markets for Imperial Tobacco are in the U.K.., Poland, Russia and the Ukraine. In Western 
Europe, subsidiaries include Reemtsma in Germany, Altadis in Spain and Seita in France. Their more 
popular brands are Davidoff, West, JPS, Gauloises Blondes and Golden Virginia. 
Tabacalera represents Imperial Brands’ international cigar business. Imperial splits its total revenues 
into three segments. A 50% stake in Habanos S.A. secures worldwide income from the promotion, 
distribution and export of Cuban cigars. Habanos S.A. is the distribution arm of the state-owned Cuban 
tobacco company, Cubatabaco. The foreign ownership of Habanos S.A. is recent: prior to 1994 
Cubatabaco was the sole company in control of the export and distribution of any Cuban tobacco 
products. The second revenue strand, Tabacalera USA leads the world’s premium cigar market. A 
product of the mergers of Tabacalera S.A. and Seita in 2000, and of Altadis and Imperial in 2008, 
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Tabacalera USA owns several cigar brands. Its core brands are Tabacalera De Garcia from the 
Dominican Republic, Flor De Copan from Honduras and Altadis U.S.A. JR Cigars provide wholesale and 
retail support, while Casa De Montecristo is a chain of walk-in stores that offer a range of premium 
cigars. The final segment of revenue, from Spanish and French markets, is managed separately.  
The American branch of Imperial Tobacco is represented by ITG brands. A product of the former 
Commonwealth-Altadis and newer assets purchased from Reynolds American in 2015, ITG is now the 
third biggest tobacco company in the U.S.A. (Imperial Brands, 2017) Imperial Brands considers the 
U.S.A. a key growth market for tobacco, as it is the most profitable market worldwide. Popular brands 
include Winston, Maverick, Kool, USA Gold, Salem, Dutch Masters and Backwoods. 
Fontem Ventures are Imperial Brands’ answer to developing non-tobacco products in today’s market. 
The popular e-cigarette brand, blu, is sold in the USA, U.K.., Italy and France. These key markets 
account for more than 70% of the e-vapour market. Research and the development of new products 
is crucial to Imperial Brands’ revenue stream from this market.  
Finally, Logista is Imperial’s logistical business division in Southern Europe. Focusing on Spain, France, 
Italy, and Portugal, the company transports both tobacco and non-tobacco products. Imperial Brands’ 
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Figure 1: Image from IMB website 
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Japan Tobacco International (JTI) 
Unlike most other tobacco companies, JTI was the result of a particular political and economic climate 
rather than entrepreneurship. Up to 1873, Japan considered tobacco an agricultural product. 
Thereafter, it began taxing the tobacco as a finished product, which in turn led to widespread tax 
evasion. It seemed logical to curb the loss in revenue by the creation of a state-led monopoly. In 1898 
the Japanese Monopoly Bureau was established and allowed the state to monitor sales more closely 
and, as a result, tax the tobacco market. Opposition by parties with an interest in the market—both 
domestic and abroad—meant compromise was necessary. The semi-monopolist agreement that 
resulted meant that the sale of tobacco leaf would be exempt from tax (JTI, 2017).  
In 1904, however, the Russo-Japanese war began. Facing a national debt crisis, the Japanese 
government completely nationalised the tobacco and salt industries in an effort to raise funds for the 
war. The economic climate subsequently improved, but restrictions on the tobacco and salt industries 
remained constant until after World War II (WWII). The rebuilding of Japan’s economy post-WWII 
brought a variety of changes, one of which was the privatisation of the salt and tobacco industries. 
Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation was formed in 1949. The tobacco company was given free 
rein on domestic tobacco production,4 and both wholesale and retail distribution (Mackenzie, 2017). 
As the Japanese economy recovered, so cigarette consumption (and, in turn, production) increased. 
Mackenzie (2017) finds that 98.5% of all cigarettes sold in Japan in 1982 were sold by Japan Tobacco. 
High barriers to entry in the form of import taxes5, the state control of tobacco shops and restrictions 
on the advertising of foreign tobacco products all supported the established monopoly. Although the 
state had technically given up control of the tobacco industry, barriers to entry were too high for 
international firms to enter the domestic market. (Mackenzie, 2017) 
The 1980s saw public opinion change again. Privatisation was viewed as a promoter of economic 
growth, and this led to the reform of the telephone, rail, and national administration systems and the 
tobacco industry. The Tobacco Business Act stipulated that the privatised company would be required 
to buy the entire domestic tobacco crop. This benefited local farmers by maintaining demand and 
ensured the Japan’s continuing role as a tobacco supplier. Although Japan Tobacco became a publicly 
traded stock, all stock was owned by the government until 1994. (Mackenzie, 2017) 
Nevertheless, the economic climate changed even though the ownership of Japan Tobacco did not. 
The U.S. Cigarette Export Association, led by PMI, RJ Reynolds and Brown & Williamson, lobbied for 
the American government to intervene in the foreign tobacco market. Specifically, they wanted 
previously closed markets like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand to be opened to any 
transnational tobacco company (TTC). The threat of trade sanctions forced countries to open their 
borders. By 1982, import tariffs were lowered from 90% to 20%, TTCs were allowed to advertise on 
television, on billboards and in magazines, and there was a more than tenfold increase in the number 
of licenced shops able to sell TTC brands. The TTCs were now able to set prices and establish sales 
networks, albeit with prior government approval (Mackenzie, 2017). 
Finally, the Plaza Accord6 in 1985 saw the Yen appreciate relative to several key currencies. As cheaper 
alternative brands of cigarette became available, possibly made more attractive by the influx of 
foreign advertising, Japan Tobacco’s7 (JT) share of the domestic tobacco market slowly declined. 
                                                          
4 This included the tobacco leaf sector. 
5 There was a 90% tariff rate on foreign tobacco products. 
6 This was an agreement between the U.S, France, Japan, the United Kingdom and West Germany to depreciate 
currencies against the Japanese Yen and German Mark  
7 This refers to Japan Tobacco before the its international arm was purchased.  
12 
 
Initially, smoking prevalence increased, but Japan has since seen a clear decrease in cigarettes 
consumption. With increased competition and decreased smoking prevalence, JT was under 
considerable pressure (Mackenzie, 2017). 
There was no single factor that forced JT to change; rather, it was a combination of economic and 
political forces that encouraged JT to change its corporate strategy. Instead of focusing on the growth 
of the domestic market where it was facing increased competition, JT had to look elsewhere to 
increase its business.  
In 1999, JT made its first significant move into the international market, when it finalised the purchase 
of the non-U.S.A. operations of RJ Reynolds (RJR). This was the first of two key acquisitions that have 
subsequently defined the company. Although this company was later absorbed by BAT in early 2017, 
the scale of the acquisition is important: US$8 billion. Mackenzie (2017) finds that while this may have 
been an excessive price for what was actually being purchased, it must be noted that both PMI and 
BAT were interested at the time in purchasing the international leg of RJR. Japan Tobacco International 
(JTI) was formed once the purchase was complete. This made JTI the third largest TTC at the time, and 
helped create a foundation on which it could continue its growth in the international market. The 
popular Camel and Winston brands were now sold by JTI internationally. These brands had, until the 
1980s, been dominant in the American market. Furthermore, the acquisition opened up markets in 
Canada and Europe that were previously unreachable (Mackenzie, 2017). 
Eight years after their first big acquisition, JTI again expanded by taking over Gallaher Group in 2007. 
The acquisition of what was then the fifth largest TTC consolidated JTI’s place in the global tobacco 
industry. At US$15 billion, the price paid was the largest for an overseas acquisition by a Japanese 
firm. It doubled JTI’s international operations by giving it access to established markets in the U.K.. 8 
and Europe. Gallaher had been established since 1854 and JTI was therefore able to add its well-known 
brands to its portfolio:  Benson & Hedges, Silk Cut, Sobanie, LD, Glamour and Mild Seven.9  
JTI’s most recent significant acquisition was through an RJR subsidiary, when it purchased the 
international selling rights of Santa Fe Natural Tobacco in 2016. It now produces the popular Natural 
American Spirit cigarettes. Mackenzie (2017) finds that the cigarette appeals both to the domestic 
Japanese and the international markets, particularly in the U.S. and Western Europe. Although JTI 
originally focused on the domestic market, it now targets numerous other geographic regions.  
In summary, JTI has now moved into all corners of the globe. Currently they categorise their cigarettes 
into international and domestic brands. Their leading international brands (in descending order, 
according to volume sold) are Winston, Camel, LD, Mevius, Benson & Hedges, Glamour, Sobranie, Silk 
Cut and Natural American Spirit. They have fewer domestic brands, focusing on Natural American 
Spirit, Seven Stars, Mevius and Winston.  
Like other companies, JTI has moved into the e-cigarette and vaping markets. Most recently, it 
purchased Logic, a leading e-vape company in the U.S.A., U.K.. and France. Similarly, it has developed 
Ploom-tech, JTI’s non-combustible tobacco alternative.  
While JTI predominantly focuses on the tobacco industry, they also underwent a degree of 
diversification during the period of increased competition. The pharmaceutical, food, and beverage 
industries were targeted. JTI’s beverage sector was sold in 2015 (Mackenzie, 2017), and JTI is likely to 
concentrate more on its tobacco-related industries.  The processed food and pharmaceutical 
                                                          
8 Gallaher Group originated in Ireland.  
9 Later renamed Mevius. 
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industries have remained relatively stable sources of income, although they provide between them 
only 11.8% of JTI’s total revenue. 
Phillip Morris International (PMI) 
Philip Morris, a tobacconist and importer of fine cigars, opened his first shop in London in 1847. As 
the business grew, he began cigarette production in 1853. William Curtis bought the prospering 
company in 1894. The company continued to prosper under his management and was appointed 
tobacconist to King Edward VII in 1902. Ownership was initially split 50-50 between American and 
British stakeholders, and it was only in 1919 that the company was incorporated in Virginia. Bought 
by the already established George J. Whelan under the name Philip Morris & Co, the company then 
began production of its hallmark cigarette Marlboro in 1924 (Philip Morris, 2017). 
“Mild as May” was Marlboro’s slogan when it was first launched. Originally it was aimed at the female 
smoker and it was only in the 1950s that PMI shifted focus and rebranded Marlboro as a masculine 
cigarette. As evidence of the health detriments of smoking surfaced, PMI introduced a cigarette filter 
as a healthier alternative, at the same time relaunching Marlboro to a new audience. A new, practical 
flip-top box, backed by the icon of American masculinity—the Marlboro Man cowboy—was born. By 
the 1960s, the Marlboro Country10 campaign was in full swing. By the 1980s, Marlboro had overtaken 














As public discernment began to change, however, so did the public’s perception of PMI. After its 
significant growth phase of the 1960s and 1970s, PMI was able to maintain an upward trend in 
cigarette sales well into the 1990s. Even when Tobacco Control was introduced in 1992, PMI was still 
experiencing record sales of around 400 billion sticks of their cigarette. Although the anti-tobacco 
movement had only just begun, it was during this period that public opinion forced change upon the 
industry. PMI felt the effects of these changes as much as the rest of the industry. 
                                                          
10 PMI’s campaign showed real cowboys at work. 
Figure 2: An early Marlboro ad 
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Smith (2003) found, based on internal documents, that PMI had a major image concern as early as the 
1980s. The public, legislators, and other opinion leaders viewed PMI less favourably than many of the 
other big companies—including Exxon Mobil.11 Image consultants at the time were particularly harsh 
in their approach to PMI, likening the sale of cigarettes to prostitution, alcoholism and drug trafficking. 
Smith (2003) found that some went further in comparison, finding similarities between PMI’s image 
and that of Volkswagen after WWII.12 PMI conducted a favourability study, which confirmed that 
public opinion was against it and that its image needed to be changed.  
In 1998, the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) targeted the largest four tobacco 
companies at the time, one of which was Philip Morris. The settlement meant that the public health 
care system was able to recover the costs of smoking-related diseases from the tobacco firms, both 
at the time and in perpetuity.  It also dissolved pro-tobacco industry trade groups,13 prevented further 
advertising for tobacco products, and helped fund new anti-smoking advocacy groups. In exchange, 
the tobacco companies were given immunity from civil prosecution by private individuals (particularly 
class action lawsuits). 
PMI had several options by which to deal with their deteriorating image. They could follow an exit 
strategy, maximising short-term profits but with no concern for the longer term. This would result in 
the eventual demise of the company, but would enable it to make the most of the assets that it had. 
At the time, much of PMI’s revenues came from their interests in food products. As these were seen 
to be sustainable, an exit strategy was not necessary or desirable. 
Secondly, PMI considered a ‘ferocious defence’, a term used to outline their tactic of reorganising 
politically and spending more on positive advertising. PMI also created Project Rainbow, which would 
involve making concessions with Congress in exchange for a period of “peace”. Instead of taking either 
of these options, PMI chose to rebrand their image, calling it PM21, that is, Philip Morris in the 21st 
century. (Smith, 2003)  
In 2001, PM21 changed the name of the Philip Morris Company to The Altria Group. The company 
wanted to change its association with tobacco, but keep its financial ties intact. After the name 
change, the Altria Group became the parent company of Philip Morris USA, John Middleton14, Kraft 
Foods, Miller Brewing Company15 and Philip Morris International.16 
In 2008 shareholders received one PMI share for each Altria share that they held, and Philip Morris 
International became a separate company. Philip Morris U.S.A – the American branch of Philip Morris 
remains a subsidiary of Altria (Bialous, 2012). 
Marlboro is PMI’s leading cigarette brand. As of 2015, it accounts for 34% of the total shipment 
volume. Currently, PMI divides its cigarette base into three tiers, each of which consist of both 
international and domestic brands. The premium tier consists of Marlboro, Virginia Slims17 and 
Parliament. Leading mid-tier brands include L & M, Lark, Merit and Philip Morris. Their more successful 
                                                          
11 This was particularly worrisome, as Exxon experienced a highly publicised oil spill in 1989. 
12 Volkswagen was tainted by its association with the Nazi party. Hitler commissioned its design as a ‘people’s 
car’.  
13 The Tobacco Institute.  
14 The second largest producer of machine-made cigars.  
15 Later to be sold to South African Breweries in 2002 and become SABMiller. 
16 This is not an exhaustive list.  
17 Originally started as a women’s cigarette brand, it was pitched as a lighter-in-taste cigarette. PMI’s strategy of 
targeting women as consumers was extremely successful during Women’s Liberation Movement of the 1960s 
and 1970s  
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international brands include Chesterfield, Red & White and Bond Street. The lower tier of cigarettes 
are typically local or regional brands.  
While cigarettes are the core of PMI’s business at present, it is important to recognise a fundamental 
shift in their approach. Since the renaming and separation of Altria, PMI and Philip Morris USA, PMI 
has invested a considerable part of their business in reduced risk products. PMI recognises the risk of 
smoking, and aims to develop new products that help smokers move away from cigarettes and toward 
smokeless alternatives. Products like the IQOS18 and TEEPS19 heated tobacco are popular, while PMI 
also offers a range of non-tobacco products. 20 
This chapter outlined some of the similarities/differences the tobacco industry has gone through 
over the past 100 years. This helps set the tone for the rest of the paper, as each of the remaining 
sections focus on a particular trend that has developed over the 2000 – 2016 period. Namely, 




















                                                          
18 PMI’s headline heated tobacco product. 
19 PMI’s product that heats tobacco using a carbon heat source.  
20 These offer nicotine release without tobacco. 
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Chapter 3: Acquisitions 
This section first identifies and develops theoretical explanations for why a company moves to acquire 
another, with a focus on “Big Tobacco”. It then discusses key trends over the past 16 years (or nearer 
if data is not consistent), including speculation on the future trend of industry acquisitions.  
An acquisition occurs when a company purchases at least 50% of the target company’s controlling 
shares. From that point, the parent company (acquiring firm) must declare the income, expenses, 
assets and liabilities of the target company on its own balance sheets. The primary aim of an 
acquisition is to increase the parent company’s bottom line and, in turn, the return to shareholders.  
Shmidt (1990) argues that this may not necessarily always be the case. A study of pre-and post-
acquisition performance showed, on average, a decrease to return on common equity (ROCE) for both 
acquiring and target firms. There were several firms, however, that did show favourable financial 
results post-acquisition, and the firms in the study were limited to the industrial sector.  The same 
results cannot be expected for “Big Tobacco” companies, especially as Shmidt (1990) concedes that 
factors outside the study’s research design could have affected the financial performance of the firms 
studied.   
Singh (1987) notes several important factors that make acquiring another firm more attractive than 
developing resources internally. The length of time it would take to develop a product internally makes 
purchasing a firm that already produces it more attractive.  The same argument applies to new brands 
or new markets. Brand entry into a new market is often more expensive than the purchase of an 
established brand or company through which to distribute. “Big Tobacco”, arguably, need not be as 
concerned about this factor, given their successful advertising boom in the 20th century.  
The second factor Singh (1987) finds is that concentrated markets allow competitors to earn 
supernormal profits and be protected by substantial barriers to entry. This makes it often more cost-
effective to purchase a company outright than to try to introduce a new company into a concentrated 
market. Singh (1987) also discusses some of the disincentives acquiring firms may have. Of most 
relevance to “Big Tobacco” is the premium that the acquiring firm may have to pay the shareholders 
of the acquired company. This premium is viewed on the balance sheet as goodwill.21 Too high a 
premium for goodwill, which is intangible, may be detrimental to share prices.  
The purchase of smaller companies can create value in three ways when the purchasing and target 
companies are related: by economies of scale, economics of scope, and market power (Singh, 1987). 
Economies of scale are found in the expanded production of a specific product. This is particularly 
appropriate to the tobacco industry, as the mechanised production of the standardised cigarette is 
extremely efficient. Singh (1987) also shows that economies of scale can extend beyond 
manufacturing to include selling, distribution, research, and development. Economies of scope, on the 
other hand, occur with the joint production of two or more products. For “Big Tobacco”, this occurs in 
the distribution system and in the manufacturing of multiple brands at shared facilities. Finally, market 
power effects occur when a market participant can influence price or quantity. In geographical areas 
where one large tobacco firm has market power, it is at least possible that market manipulation may 
occur.  
With these factors in mind, Singh (1987) finds that, compared to unrelated acquisitions, related 
acquisitions do in fact create extra value. The abnormal returns in the post-acquisition period are 
experienced more by the acquired firm than the acquiring firm, but nevertheless the net result is an 
                                                          
21 The ‘goodwill’ payment is the amount paid for a company above its book value 
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increase in shareholder value. Note, however, that the effect attenuates from the point of 
announcement. As this study covers more than just one year, the return attributable to each purchase 
may be expected to decrease with time. Similar results to those of Singh (1987) were found by Fowler 
(1988), although that study was on manufacturing firms. Harrison (1991), however, found that key 
differences between acquiring and acquired firms generate their own source of value. These studies 
found that specific shared resources provided a better explanation for financial performance than did 
typical merger and acquisition (M & A) synergies.  
Yip (1982) finds that the choice between acquisition or direct entry into markets is often determined 
by the entrant’s competitiveness. Firms that could be in a competitive position upon entrance would 
choose direct entry over acquisition. For “Big Tobacco”, it makes sense that acquisitions are required 
for profitable entry. The cigarette has existed for at least two centuries and little innovation can be 
provided to existing markets, other than the e-cigarette. Similarly, Yip (1982) found that acquiring 
weak companies would strengthen a company’s position and give it an opportunity to bolster its 
bottom line.  
Interestingly, Jones (2000) found that, with reference to technological development, firms with 
greater internal resources than their peers typically choose internal development over acquisitions. 
The paper also finds that a firm’s performance is typically negatively impacted by external acquisitions 
of technology. This does not seem to apply to “Big Tobacco”, as they apparently choose to purchase 
firms with e-cigarette technology rather than developing their own. It may be that these acquisitions 
are a form of market consolidation, instead of technology sourcing.   
Horizontal mergers occur when an acquiring firm purchases a company operating in the same 
operational space. Typically, they both offer the same product or service as competitors, and the 
purchase is attractive because of their cost-based or revenue-based synergies. Vertical mergers, on 
the other hand, represent acquisitions that occur between firms in different stages of the production 
process. Brush (1996) finds a positive performance synergy between horizontal merging firms, in some 
respects mirroring the findings of Fowl (1988) and Singh (1987). King (2004), on the other hand, finds 
that there are either zero or negative effects on financial performance in the post-acquisition period 
for horizontal mergers. However, King (2004) concedes that there may be other factors that his model 
does not account for, in particular the difficulty of organic, internally fuelled growth, and the more 
rapid access to resources provided by merger than by internal development. Both are unexplored and 
difficult to quantify in his study. Meador (1996) focused on the drivers of the choice of horizontal 
mergers over vertical mergers. For supply chain acquisitions, the study found that dividend policy was 
the most important variable in deciding whether or not a firm was likely to be the target of a takeover. 
That is, firms with reliable dividend payouts were seen to be more often targeted for acquisition. 
Meador (1996) also argues that this may be linked to profitability of a target firm, as dividends occur 
only when a firm is repeatedly profitable and able to make cash payouts.  
The second most important factor is total assets. Increases in total assets were seen to negatively 
affect the probability of acquisition. This seems intuitive as larger firms require more investment from 
the acquiring firm. It does however, have interesting implications for this paper: the only acquisitions 
that are seen to have material effect on the bottom line of “Big Tobacco” are those of large firms. 
Smaller firms, although possibly easier targets, may offer little in the way of competitive advantage or 
market entry for the tobacco industry.  
For horizontal mergers, Meador finds that asset growth and sales growth are the most significant 
variables that affect the probability of a takeover. Firms with older, undervalued assets are more likely 
to be targeted for takeover. Sales growth, in contrast to total asset growth, was seen to influence 
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positively the probability of a takeover. Firms that are able to generate sales growth more quickly 
were seen as attractive propositions. This is likely to be true of “Big Tobacco” acquisitions.  
However, Meador (1996) finds few other significant variables that reliably affect takeover probability. 
Given that the study was conducted over a number of industries, it may be that vertical mergers are 
typically company specific, which would make the results difficult to interpret.  
Uysal (2002) argues that acquisitions that are related geographically create higher returns than 
acquisitions that are geographically further apart. The paper concludes that higher value acquisitions 
are geographically linked because of information advantages. This was true for all acquisitions, 
whether vertical or horizontal. This was a very large study (over 3 700 acquisitions) and its findings 
may not apply to “Big Tobacco”. An older study conducted by Doukas (1988) finds that multinational 
corporations (MNCs) that conduct an international acquisition for the first time see very little in the 
way of abnormal returns, whereas companies that have purchased multiple international companies 
have a higher chance of subsequent abnormal returns. These abnormal returns are seen to be larger 
when the company invests in an economy less developed than that of the U.S. A. Hitt (1997) finds a 
decrease in returns the more a company diversifies internationally, though this is offset the more a 
company diversifies its products. This contradicts expectations of “Big Tobacco” synergy through 
acquisition, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Uysal (2002) also argues, against Singh (1987), 
that an acquisition need not be in related industry. Aybar (2009) finds that the same positive effects 
are not seen in emerging market multinationals, where international acquisitions can in fact destroy 
firm value.  
Lamanen (2008) considers the case of serial acquirers, firms that rapidly and repeatedly acquire 
multiple firms. The study concludes that there is a clear negative correlation between firm 
performance and a high rate of acquisitions. Firms aiming to ‘manufacture’ earnings through serial 
acquisitions perform poorly subsequently. However, these negative effects are lessened by two 
factors: the acquiring firm’s size and acquisition experience. “Big Tobacco”, given the size and age of 
its firms, should see fewer performance drops. A longer-term study conducted by Fowler (1989) 
supports the idea that there are mitigating factors to the negative effects described by Lamanen 
(2008).  
In summary, much has been written to explain the costs and benefits of corporate takeovers. 
Numerous studies find that related acquisitions are seen to increase the return on common equity 
(ROCE) more than unrelated acquisitions. The relative geographic location of the acquired and 
acquiring firms is on average seen as supporting an increase in ROCE. Shareholders expect an increase 
in ROCE, and revise their valuations upward, which leads to upward pressure on “Big Tobacco’s” stock 
price. Furthermore, acquisitions typically come from companies that do not offer a unique product, as 
the benefits of acquisition decrease with product distinctiveness (Singh, 1987). Firms that have 
extensive internal resources typically prefer internal product development over acquisitions. This 
should not be the case with “Big Tobacco”, however, as one would expect the benefits of synergy to 
be greater than the costs of product development, especially given the maturity of both the cigarette 
as a product and the surrounding tobacco markets. Strong dividends and growth in the assets and 
sales of the target firm are the most important factors in acquisition trends for both horizontal and 
vertical mergers. Although acquisitions can be lucrative, it must be noted that ‘serial acquirers’ (firms 
that seek to fabricate earnings through numerous acquisitions) may suffer as a result.  
Before considering the acquisitions made by ”Big Tobacco”, it is important to recognise the difference 
between an outright acquisition, a joint venture and a joint operation. An acquisition (at least in this 
context) is the outright purchase of a company. All assets, liabilities, income, and expenses are 
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included on the group’s statement from the time the acquisition is complete. A joint operation, on the 
other hand, is an arrangement whereby the two parties have rights to the assets, and obligations for 
the liabilities, of the resultant company in proportion to their interests. Finally, a joint venture gives 
both parties the right to the net assets of the resultant company. While an acquisition offers synergies 
within the firm, joint ventures and joint operations offer an additional kind of synergy, one attained 
by working with a competitor in a particular market. Joint ventures and joint operations also offer the 
same benefits and suffer from the same drawbacks as an acquisition might, but to a different degree.  
A summary of “Big Tobacco’s” acquisitions from 2000–2016 can be found in Appendix 1A. Companies 
smaller than $30 million at the time of purchase have been excluded. The commentary below, as well 
as the graphs showing market acquisitions, is derived directly from Appendix 1A. It is important to 
recall that PMI was founded in 2007 as a spinoff from its parent company, Altria. Purchases that were 
made in the international market by its parent company and given to PMI as part of the spinoff have 
been included in the acquisition table prior to PMI’s formation. Appendix 1A is compiled from each of 
“Big Tobacco’s” financial statements for the years in question. If more information was required, 
additional news articles, financial documents and items of acquisition were sourced.  
There are three overarching trends in recent acquisitions by “Big Tobacco”: 
1. Acquisitions in the EU and the Americas are the highest in value, but are not the sole focus of 
Big Tobacco.  
2. There is a lack of diversity in acquisitions, as most of the acquisitions are tobacco companies, 
logistics companies and, most recently, e-cigarette companies or brands. 
3. The acquisitions by “Big Tobacco” appear to be aimed at a worldwide consolidation of the 

















Purchasing of businesses is occurring in EU and the Americas in value, but across all 
markets in number 
This section discusses findings of Uysal (2002) as to whether or not “Big Tobacco” acquisitions are 
related geographically. The multivariate analysis in the next chapter looks at the effects of these 
acquisitions, but there is no direct relation between the location of acquisition and current “Big 
Tobacco” trends. In fact, all the “Big Tobacco” companies have focused their investments—in terms 
of value—on the EU and the Americas. The Asian and European, Middle Eastern and African (EEMEA) 




Figure 3: Total acquisition value per region 
 
The figure above shows that “Big Tobacco” is acquiring companies of value in the EU and American 
regions, regardless of their domestic market. For example, the value of EU acquisitions is driven by 
BAT, JTI and IMB. Each of these three has European operations. IMB is based in the UK, JTI has a firm 
European presence owing to their previous acquisition of Gallaher, and BAT also operates out of the 
U.K.. Of the four “Big Tobacco” companies, PMI has spent the least on purchasing firms in the EU.  
Over half of the acquisition value in the Americas is caused by a single acquisition, the purchase of 
Reynolds American by BAT. BAT previously had interests in America through their purchase of shares 
of Brown & Williamson, and maintained their interest by providing funding for Brown & Williamson’s 
purchase of Lorillard. Without the purchase of the remaining $49 billion in RJR stock that BAT did not 
own, the Americas would be split roughly equally in terms of acquisition value amongst “Big Tobacco”. 
Each of the firms looks to consolidate their hold on the American tobacco market further.  
PMI has followed a different strategy across all regions. It has spent a total of $14 billion in acquisitions 
over the past 16 years. This is less than half the acquisition value of its nearest competitor, JTI. One 
would expect acquisitions to have less impact on PMI’s stock price over the long term than those of 
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to PMI’s success. PMI is, however, the main driver of purchases in Asia. PMI’s return to the Chinese 
market—albeit limited—and expansion in other Asian regions helps explains its spending in Asia.  
The U.S.A. and Europe are by far the most sought-after regions, in absolute terms, measured by 
acquisition spending. There are two likely reasons for this. In the first place, the European and 
American markets are well-established. Smoking prevalence is in fact decreasing, and the market is 
saturated with numerous cigarette brands that cater for the existing smoking population. To gain 
market share in these markets, therefore, companies need to purchase companies instead of 
increasing their brand internally. It is more difficult to increase profits in a market that is already 
saturated than in one that is not. One of the ways to deal with this is through merger synergy, either 
cost reduction or other logistical advantages that a merged firm might have access to. Brush’s (1996) 
theory on horizontal and vertical mergers should, in theory, apply to “Big Tobacco” here. The EU and 
American markets have reached a point of consolidation, and one of the few ways to increase profits 
and growth is from streamlining the production and sales processes.      
Secondly, there are in fact well established businesses that exist in developed markets. Smaller 
companies not yet owned by “Big Tobacco”, such as those in developing countries—are unlikely to 
affect any of “Big Tobacco’s” bottom lines materially, or cost more than $30 million to acquire. These 
companies would therefore not appear in any of the financial reports nor in this study.  
While both these arguments appear to fall down when the Asian market is considered, there are 
extenuating circumstances that make Asia a special case. Asia has a large, well-established smoking 
market that should, in theory, be an acquisition target for “Big Tobacco”. However, the figure below 
shows that the CNTC controls the majority of the market. CNTC, as mentioned earlier, is a state-run 



















Market share of Big Tobacco per region 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Asia Pacific     
CNTC 66,30 67,40 67,40 67,80 68,50 
PMI 8,10 8,40 8,60 8,10 8,10 
JTI 6,20 5,20 5,20 5,30 5,10 
BAT 4,60 4,50 4,40 4,40 4,30 
Total 85,20 85,50 85,60 85,60 86,00 
      
Eastern Europe     
PMI 27,00 26,90 27,30 27,20 28,30 
JTI 27,40 27,60 27,80 28,50 27,50 
BAT 19,40 20,00 20,90 21,20 21,20 
IMB 12,40 12,30 11,90 11,40 11,10 
Total 86,20 86,80 87,90 88,30 88,10 
      
Middle East & Africa    
BAT  21,80 23,70 24,70 25,30 27,10 
PMI 13,80 13,80 14,60 17,00 18,60 
IMB 16,30 16,00 16,80 17,90 17,80 
JTI 13,00 13,70 14,10 14,10 14,10 
Total 64,90 67,20 70,20 74,30 77,60 
      
Western Europe     
PMI 37,00 38,00 38,60 38,90 38,20 
JTI 18,00 18,40 19,20 19,80 20,80 
BAT 19,70 19,30 19,00 18,30 18,10 
IMB 17,50 17,00 16,30 16,40 16,40 
Total 92,20 92,70 93,10 93,40 93,50 
Table 1: Market share of “Big Tobacco” over time 
Source: Mackenzie (2017) 
The distribution of market share in the figure above supports the theory discussed earlier. “Big 
Tobacco” is purchasing companies in well-developed markets instead of spending resources on new 
brand development, at least in the context of cigarettes. As cigarettes have been in these markets for 
more than 100 years, “Big Tobacco” does not have any entrant power. If the American and EU markets 
were still in a growth phase, it might have been feasible to enter the market with a unique product. 
Instead, “Big Tobacco” needs to enhance their position by way of acquisition. With reference to 
Meador (1996), the negative correlation between asset size and takeover probability is interesting 
here. Given the sheer size of “Big Tobacco” companies, it could be argued that total assets make 
companies more attractive. They offer the possibility of taking over entire regions, despite the high 
asking price. This is supported by Lemanen (2008), who finds that the negative correlation between 





While the logical next step would be to compare cigarette sales volume and acquisition areas, there 
is no reliable way to compare region to region between “Big Tobacco” companies. The first problem 
is that PMI and JTI are the only two companies to maintain the same sales regions over the period in 
question. Both BAT and IMB have reclassified certain areas to maintain a more level sales distribution. 
When a region is reclassified to include different countries, cigarette sales figures change. Any analysis 
would therefore not be valid. A second dilemma is the difference between each company’s core sales 
regions. Each company has its own target market and, therefore, focuses on key revenue areas. JTI is 
an example of this, as they classify the ‘rest of the world’ as one of their main sales areas, accounting 
for an average of 20% of total sales volume. IMB is far more particular, and lists sales volume by 
country, while BAT and PMI maintain a regional overview. Finally, there is also the problem of 
‘acquiring’ sales. That is to say, an increase in a particular region may be due to a delay in taking on an 
acquired firm’s income revenues, and subsequently, their cigarette sales values. Appendix 1B shows 
sales volume and geographical classification changes over the past 16 years. 
It is possible, however, to comment on how trends relate to “Big Tobacco’s” current operations. In the 
case of PMI, the majority of acquisitions have matched their tobacco sales in Asia. This is evidence 
that PMI look to expand their share of the Asian markets. This contrasts with the EEMEA region, where 
they have spent relatively little on acquisitions. BAT, on the other hand, has made a number of 
acquisitions in their smallest market, the U.S.A. and, more broadly, the Americas. IMB has used a 
somewhat mixed strategy, furthering their interests in their key markets (Spain and Germany), while 
acquiring firms in the U.S.A. to continue their growth in the Americas. JTI has aggressively pursued 
outside markets over the period in question. Their rest of the world region, which started at 15% of 
total cigarettes sold, grew to just over 37% by 2016. This shows the importance of JTI’s strategy of 
moving abroad because of Japan’s stagnating domestic market. Looking forward, we may see CNTC 
follow a similar strategy. This is discussed further in the market consolidation section below.  
Lack of diversity in acquisition 
Another overarching trend of “Big Tobacco” is the lack of diversity in their acquisitions. Unlike the 
trends of the 1960s where “Big Tobacco” purchased food, paper, and alcohol companies, the trend 
seems limited from 2000 to 2016. Acquisitions are more focused on tobacco-related products. This 
includes not just cigarettes, but cigars, snuff, and electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS). We also 
find extensions into the logistics business. Similarly, “Big Tobacco” has focused on diversification by 
market segment and geographical segment.  
Diversification by market segment  
All of the “Big Tobacco” companies have continued their trend of separating their premium and lower-
margin cigarettes, and this has shown in their acquisitions. IMB has purchased Altadis and JR Cigars. 
Both have premium and lower-margin cigarettes. This strategy is reflected in their financial statements 
too, as they differentiate between growth brands and specialist brands only. This is in contrast to the 
rest of “Big Tobacco”, who still disclose sales by brand. 
Diversification by geographical segment 
Appendix 1A shows that acquisitions are happening in all regions in similar numbers. Although the 
figure shows the EU and the Americas as being the key acquisition areas, this is not to say that other 
regions have been ignored. There are roughly 15 acquisitions for each of the regions, all valued at over 
$30 million, but with costs varying significantly.  
These results are similar to those of Liemt (2002), in that “Big Tobacco” has looked to counter its 
stagnating markets by expansion into other regions. JTI started by purchasing the international branch 
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of RJ Reynolds, and went on to purchase Gallaher, Gryson NV, and Arian Tobacco. These are all firms 
geographically far from Japan’s domestic market. BAT has some of the furthest-reaching corporate 
ventures, and have continued to expand in the past 16 years. Investments in Canada, Italy, the U.S.A., 
Turkey and Brazil have furthered their interests outside their domestic U.K.. market. PMI have made 
significant investments in Indonesia, Mexico, Canada, and the Philippines. While not an acquisition, 
PMI’s investment in the Chinese market since its semi-liberalisation signals PMI’s intention to continue 
spreading its interest outside its primary market. IMB is no different, as their investments in the U.S.A., 
Spain and Germany have helped offset the stagnating markets in the U.K..  
Diversification by non-tobacco product 
Liemt (2002) found that most “Big Tobacco” companies were embarking on a strategy of buying foods 
and breweries during the early and late 1990s. Since the spinoff of PMI, very little of this has 
continued. PMI, BAT and IMB have consistently focused on tobacco as their main source of revenue, 
and acquisitions have mirrored this. While JTI maintains a small share in the food and pharmaceutical 
markets, no new acquisitions valued at $30 million or more were made during the period in question.  
The only area in which “Big Tobacco” has made considerable acquisitions is in logistics. The table 
below summarises logistic acquisitions from 2000 to 2016.  
 
PMI Company Targeted Acquisition 
type 
Country Region Cost associated 
2013 Megapolis – part 
purchase of 20% 
Acquisition Russia EEMEA $750 million 
JTI      
2013 Megapolis 20% share Acquisition Russia EEMEA $750 million 
2016 Fluxo Brasil 
Distribuidora do 
Produtos 
Acquisition Brazil Americas Undisclosed 
IMB      
2008 Altadis Acquisition Spain European 
Union 
$17 billion 
2008 Logista22 Acquisition Spain European 
Union 
$1.3 billion  
Table 2: “Big Tobacco” diversification in non-tobacco companies 
Note that, at the time of acquisition, the subsidiary logistics business Logista accounted for 20% of 
Altadis’ total revenue. IMB made the decision to pursue Logista in its entirety by purchasing the 
outstanding shares for $1.3 billion.  
The logistical sector seems an intuitive extension for “Big Tobacco”. Not only do they provide a 
cheaper alternative to outsourcing transportation and delivery across the supply chain, they are to a 
degree hedged against a tobacco downturn, as they do not rely solely on tobacco distribution. BAT is 
the only “Big Tobacco” company not to engage in any acquisition in the logistics industry, and has 
continued its strategy of outsourcing logistics.  
 
                                                          
22 Those shares that were not originally owned by Altadis at the time of acquisition; the remaining 40% 
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Diversification by tobacco product 
“Big Tobacco” has continued the trend that Liemt (2002) first noted, diversification outside the 
cigarette market into other tobacco products. Cigars, menthol cigarettes, snus and e-cigarettes have 
all been targets of acquisition by “Big Tobacco”. IMB, for example, purchased Commonwealth Brands 
in 2007. Although Commonwealth Brands mainly focused on cigarette sales, there was a considerable 
portion devoted to cigar and hand-rolled tobacco. Just two years later, IMB purchased JR Cigars & 
MCM Management, again with a focus on alternatives to the cigarette market. Similarly, JTI purchased 
Gryson NV, a company with a focus on hand-rolled or make-your-own cigarettes. Sales of papers, 
tubes and other accessories form part of the company’s base.  
One of the more recent categories for expansion is alternative ways of tobacco heating. Electronic 
cigarettes (commonly e-cigarettes), vapourisers, or ENDS systems are battery operated devices that 
offer alternative means of nicotine delivery, without burning tobacco. The market is broadly divided 
into two groups. The first consists of e-cigarettes. These devices are often called cig-alikes, as they 
closely resemble traditional cigarettes, but without the smoke that is characteristic of tobacco 
burning. Instead, they produce a nicotine-infused vapor that the user inhales. Vaporisers, on the other 
hand, look very unlike a traditional cigarette. While vapourisers can also produce a nicotine-infused 
vapour, they are able to vapourise a number of different liquids, waxes, oils or dry herbs as the name 
suggests. E-cigarettes, however, focus on the heating of nicotine.  
There were 466 brands of e-cigarettes, with 7 764 unique flavours in 2014 (Zhu, 2014). With such 
variety in selection—in contrast to cigarettes—e-cigarettes have had much success in online sales. 
Most of the success of e-cigarettes is driven by the ‘modular’ sub-category, vaping devices that have 
a higher initial cost, but are cheaper to maintain.  
The e-cigarette and vaping market was valued at around $7 billion in 2016. Estimations concur that a 
20% compound annual growth rate (CAGR) would put the industry at around $50 billion in 2025. With 
BAT’s estimate of the global cigarette industry at $700 billion, and the non-cigarette tobacco industry 
at $70 billion, the e-cigarette industry is rapidly becoming competitive. The implication of this is far-
reaching. “Big Tobacco” needs, either organically or through acquisitions, to develop in-house 
competitors in the e-market. “Big Tobacco” has followed a strategy of both acquiring and developing 















BAT Company Targeted Acquisition 
type 
Country  Region Cost associated 
2012  CN creative  Acquisition U.K. European 
Union 
$65 million 
2016 Ten Motives Acquisition UK European 
Union 
$72 million 
PMI      
2014 Nicocigs Limited Acquisition U.K. European 
Union 
$103 million 
JTI      
2011 Ploom Minority 
stake 
acquisition 
Japan Asia Undisclosed 





2015 Ploom tech24 Acquisition U.S Americas Undisclosed 
2015 Logic Acquisition U.S Americas Undisclosed 
IMB      
2013 Dragonite 
International E-Vape 
Acquisition U.S Americas $75 million 
2015 Reynolds American 
blu, and four other 
brands 
Acquisition U.S European 
Union 
$7.1 billion 
Table 3: “Big Tobacco” purchases in the e-cig market 
Each of the “Big Tobacco” companies has found the e-cigarette and vaping markets to be important 
to future revenue. Given the industry growth projected above, one would expect numerous 
acquisitions in the e-cigarette and vaping markets, as “Big Tobacco” companies look to maintain their 
position in the market and gain a competitive edge in the early stages of development, for which costs 
are high. 
It is important to note, however, that the table above only outlines the acquisitions of e-cigarette or 
vaping companies. This is not to say that “Big Tobacco” have not invested in their own in-house brands. 
Each firm has taken its own approach. Although PMI has spent less than its competitors on purchases 
in the vaping industry, they invested over $3 billion in the development of their in-house e-cigarette,25 
the iQos. Considering that the market is valued at only $7 billion today, this suggests that PMI views 
the industry as important for future growth. JTI have opted to purchase existing technology by 
Zandera in the e-vaping market, and Ploom Tech in the vaping market. Their acquisition of Logic in the 
U.S. allowed JTI to become the third biggest seller of e-cigarettes in the country. BAT has invested 
considerably in Vype, after acquiring its creator CN Creative just a year before the product was 
released. IMB have followed a similar strategy to that of JTI by acquiring the already established brand 
blu, and maintaining investment thereafter.  
                                                          
23 Multiple of E-Lites yearly revenue of $26 million. 
24 Name changed to Pax-labs. 
25 The iQos does contain real tobacco, however, unlike other e-cigarettes. 
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Larger acquisitions signal worldwide market consolidation 
BAT, PMI, IMB and JTI control roughly 40% of world tobacco by market share. Adding CNTC, the top 
five tobacco companies control over 80% of the global tobacco industry, on aggregate. While 80% may 
seem high, some countries have a single firm or government organisation in control of their domestic 
market. Acquisitions in the past 16 years have shown a trend of industry consolidation, as each of the 
TTCs has acquired many of the market leaders in each region. The EEMEA, the EU, Americas and Asia 
have each seen multiple acquisitions that have helped confirm “Big Tobacco’s” control of the global 
market.  
Fifteen years ago, the top five consisted of Philip Morris,26 British American Tobacco, Japan Tobacco, 
Reemsta and Altadis. Only the first three remain as the industry has continued to consolidate. Reemsta 
and Altadis have both been bought out by what is now Imperial Brands, the latest addition to “Big 
Tobacco”. The magnitude of recent acquisitions is therefore a strong indicator of consolidation. The 
top five acquisitions by “Big Tobacco” over the period cost $95.6 billion, whereas the smallest five 
acquisitions only cost $194 million. This gap in value between the top five and bottom five signals the 
maturity of the tobacco market. It is also important to remember that this gap does not show the 
fullest extent of the disparity between purchases, as our study is limited to purchases over $30 million, 
and is seen to have material influence on revenue for each of the “Big Tobacco” companies.27  
For the majority of the larger acquisitions, the purchase has helped consolidate market position in a 
given region. For example, BAT, PMI, JTI and IMB have all aimed to consolidate their market power in 
each region in which they operate. JTI’s purchase of the international branch of RJ Reynolds helped 
expand its array of brands sold internationally. The purchase of Gallaher seven years later for $14 
billion again helped consolidate its hold in the European market, while its purchase of Natural 
American in 2016 furthered its interests abroad with the American brand of cigarettes. The situation 
is similar for the other “Big Tobacco” companies. BAT has furthered its interests in Canada, Italy, 
Denmark, Brazil and the U.S.A. IMB has purchased Reemtsma in Germany, Altadis in Spain, and various 
brands from Reynolds American, again to increase its portfolio of brands abroad and consolidate its 
position. PMI purchased tobacco companies in the Philippines and Indonesia. All of these purchases 
have been at least $1 billion in value, and in markets that the firms look to become market leaders in.  
The trend seems to have begun even before the 2000s. Liemt (2002) finds that consolidation started 
accelerating in the late 1990s, as the size of the acquisitions steadily increased. This in turn made the 
contribution of acquisitions to the marketing global brands ever more important and economies of 
scale from these mergers more beneficial. By lowering the number of manufacturing locations and 
increasing efficiency at each, companies were able to increase their bottom line.  
Liemt (2002) points out that consolidation occurs in multiple ways. First, smaller businesses are 
purchased by slightly larger ones. In the European context, for example, Austria Tabak purchased the 
cigarette activities of Swedish Match. Austria Tabak was then bought out by Gallaher which was, in 
turn, purchased by JTI in 2007. The trend has continued through all of “Big Tobacco”, as there has 
been both vertical and horizontal integration for IMB, BAT and PMI over the past 16 years. After having 
possibly been called in for advice on farming, manufacturing or some other aspect of production, the 
multinational would soon embark on a joint venture with, or acquire equity stake in, the company. As 
the company grew in production efficiency in each market, it would become a possible takeover target 
by a larger tobacco firm. Although Appendix 1A is restricted to purchases over $30 million, the 
consolidation process shows a snowball effect—purchases of smaller companies are followed by 
                                                          
26 Prior to the Philip Morris International spinoff in 2007, Phillip Morris was the parent company. 
27 Appendix 1A is therefore a non-exhaustive list of all acquisitions. 
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larger ones as they become more attractive in production efficiency. Liemt (2002) also points out that 
multinationals offer what smaller investors cannot. Once a company has grown (through acquisitions 
or internal growth) to a point at which the domestic market is saturated, the only entity that is able 
to offer the required funds for efficiency improvement to an international scale is a multinational “Big 
Tobacco” company. Smaller domestic investors, or even the State, are unlikely to be able to fund the 
investment in new equipment that would allow competitiveness in the open market.  
The benefits of a purchase were not felt only by the multinational, however, as the advantages for the 
firm being purchased are just as important. The increase in investment would help them upgrade their 
production facilities and improve efficiencies all along the manufacturing line. Liemt (2002) notes that 
this is typically accompanied by more training for their employees, a more modern distribution system 
(if it is outdated) and updated information systems. The transfer of knowledge would also increase 
efficiency and in turn, profit margins.  
The second way consolidation has occurred in tobacco is on the national level. State monopolies have 
been purchased—to a degree—by large multinationals, thereby opening their markets to competition 
abroad. A good example of this is JTI, which was originally a state-run monopoly. However, the 
Japanese government has retained at least a 30% share in the company. Liemt (2002) also finds that 
privatisation is often accompanied by trade liberalisation. This applies to JTI’s expansion into the 
international market, while IMB, BAT and PMI were all formed through free-market competition.   
Finally, Liemt (2002) finds that consolidation has occurred when firms have targeted their own 
domestic markets. JTI is again an example, as it was only once their domestic market began to stagnate 
that they looked abroad (Mckenzie, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 4: Global cigarette consumption 
Source 1: The Tobacco Atlas (2017) 
One of the reasons “Big Tobacco” has had to look outside its original market to expand its earnings is 
the worldwide trend of cigarette consumption. The WHO have found a significant decrease in smoking 
prevalence across the globe. As shown in the figure above, the only strong upward swing in smoking 
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of cigarettes being smoked per person. According to the WHO, the average Chinese smoker now 
smokes 50% more than he or she did in 1980.  
While it may seem strange that CNTC has the largest global market share (see figure 5 below), this is 
because CNTC has a state-controlled monopoly of the Chinese market. Although PMI has recently re-
entered the Chinese market, CNTC is in control of the largest market of cigarettes in the world, 
producing around 2.5 trillion sticks per year. China is the top consumer of cigarettes, consuming ten 
times the number as its nearest competitor, Russia (Euromonitor, 2015). CNTC is also in control of all 
aspects of production, allowing it stronger margins from tobacco farming, as well as from distribution 
of the final product.  
The rest of the “Big Tobacco” companies, however, have had to look elsewhere to maintain their 
revenues. Table 1 shows this occurring in all regions. The Asian Pacific region has become increasingly 
concentrated, with CNTC maintaining its powerful position through its influence in China. Most of 
Europe has remained stagnant in terms of “Big Tobacco” power, with Western Europe being almost 
entirely controlled by the big four. The Middle East and Africa have shown a strong decrease in free 
market competition from 2000 to 2014. The latest, and largest acquisition to date, is currently 
underway, with BAT consolidating its position in the American market.  
In some respects, these results seem intuitive. Liemt (2002) points out that, in order to be profitable, 
cigarette production needs to be at high. With smoking prevalence falling, there are only two ways to 
maintain positive profits: either companies must increase profits on existing cigarette sales or 
purchase existing businesses in order to maintain output. While the former is discussed later in this 














The latest and largest of these acquisitions has been the BAT-Reynolds merger. Finalised in 2017, BAT 
has made a move to confirm its interests in the U.S.A. and to challenge its competitor PMI in terms of 
revenues declared. The sort of large-scale acquisition completed by BAT supports Liemt (2002)’s 






Estimated market share of BAT-Reynolds merger
IMB JTI BAT-Reynolds PMI CNTC Others
Figure 5: Bloomberg estimates of global tobacco market share 
Source 2: Chambers (2016) 
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reached its summit, however, as many market analysts have noted that IMB is a potential takeover 
target.      
Mirroring the consolidation of the alcohol industry, 28, investors have hedged against a move from 
four to three major international tobacco companies. If IMB were to be acquired, it would dwarf the 
Reynolds American takeover by about $20 billion. With a typical industry premium of around 30%, this 
would be the largest takeover to date.  
IMB is attractive for a number of reasons. Imperial is the smallest of the “Big Tobacco” companies. In 
fact, the next largest company, JTI, is almost twice its size. Ease of takeover therefore gives the edge 
to the top three tobacco companies. Secondly, IMB is focused in the heavily-segmented European 
market. This means that there are more gains to be had in the way of post-merger synergies. More 
effective routes to market interactions for the acquiring firm’s brands are also expected in the region. 
Finally, Price/Earnings (P/E) ratios of the industry currently average around 22. With Imperial’s 
earnings per share (EPS) having fallen over the past year, their P/E hovers around 15. Combined with 
a weakened pound, this makes takeover costs easier on the acquiring firm.  
As attractive as IMB might seem, there are a number of difficulties that would need to be overcome 
before the acquisition would be possible.  
1) Cost concerns 
PMI is excluded from extending its reach in Europe as it has negative shareholder equity. This is 
discussed further in the next section but, in summary, despite PMI’s strong cash flow, it has very little 
ability to raise further capital. Leveraged buyouts, depreciation and adjustments to intangible assets 
typically contribute to a net negative shareholder equity. A takeover by BAT is dismissed by most 
because of the number of its recent acquisitions. Its recent purchase of Reynolds American makes it 
highly unlikely that BAT would be able to maintain strong financial indicators if it tried to raise further 
debt and equity. JTI is excluded for another reason. As Japanese law requires JTI to be at least one-
third owned by the State it cannot dilute its common stock in order to raise funds to purchase IMB. 
While a share buyback would mean that they could maintain the state share, JTI has not historically 
conducted many share buybacks, unless they were shares sold by the State.  
Although IMB is an attractive target at the moment, it is unlikely that any of the “Big Tobacco” firms 
will be able to overcome their financing constraints.  
2) Anti-trust issues 
If any of the three were able to raise enough capital for the purchase, they would have to navigate 
anti-trust legislation. Given that each of the three possible acquirers have interests that overlap with 
IMB markets, it is likely that a geographical dividing of the assets would be a condition of the merger. 
The acquisition would risk breaching monopoly thresholds in various regions, depending on which 
company was the purchaser. PMI would have anti-trust issues in Germany and France, while JTI would 
have difficulties in Spain and Britain. BAT also would face problems, as their interest in Europe and the 
American interests acquired through Reynolds American would conflict with IMB’s ITG Brands.29  
 
 
                                                          
28 AB InBev’s $100 billion purchase of SAB-Miller. 
29 Imperial Brands U.S.A.  
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3) Valuation problems 
In addition to the direct cost issues, the acquiring firm would face a number of valuation issues. The 
most important of these is how to price the synergies they expect to attain in the post-acquisition 
period. Differences are also expected between the developed and developing countries in which 
Imperial is present. This problem is vital as the goodwill the acquirer would pay for Imperial is related 
to the expected synergy value of the merged firm. If the acquisition is mispriced, the post-merger 
synergies will be outweighed by the cost of IMB. This implies a net decrease in the bottom line for the 
purchasing firm, and a following share price downgrade as investors expect less from future revenue 
streams.  
Although it is unlikely that any of the big three tobacco firms would be able to purchase IMB in the 
foreseeable future, there is nevertheless one possible contender. Many industry analysts consider 
that CNTC is unlikely to shift its focus to the international horizon. However, the Chinese market is 
always changing, and a number of previous barriers to entry or expansion no longer exist. The shift 
toward a more liberal market started in the late 1990s, as pressure from the impending accede to the 
WTO meant that the CNTC needed to prepare for liberalised markets. Fang (2016) finds four key areas 
that CNTC have focused on as the company moves from its sole focus on the domestic market to a 
‘go-global’30 multi-market approach.    
The restructuring of the Chinese tobacco industry was the first step, and was intended to undo the 
protectionary measures introduced by provincial governments in the 1990s. The State Tobacco 
Monopoly Administration (STMA) saw the domestic tobacco market as fragmented and inefficient 
compared to the established global market. With WTO accession on the horizon, the STMA 
categorised each firm by size, and assigned it one of four categories. The smallest firms were to declare 
bankruptcy, and medium-sized firms were to be absorbed by other provincial, regional, or even inter-
provincial firms depending on their size. This helped reduce the number of firms in the Chinese 
market, and provide many of the economies of scale advantages a larger firm would have. A similar 
process occurred for the manufacturing and distribution arms of the tobacco industry. STMA’s vision 
was to reduce the production process to three tiers. Municipal factories would act as subsidiaries of 
provincial factories, as the latter would act as subsidiaries of CNTC. Fang (2016) notes that CNTC may 
follow JTI in allowing the most successful of firms to become publicly listed.  
                                                          




Secondly, CNTC changed its product development, specifically segmenting its branding, with fewer 
brands each targeting a particular market. They chose to have one brand that had mass appeal, a 
second brand that favoured international markets, and a more expensive premium brand. With fewer 
brands in production, factories would see further economies of scale.  
Thirdly, CNTC began the expansion of Chinese cigarette exports. CNTC established the China Tobacco 
Import Export Group (CNTIEG) to head up international operations. CNTIEG’s focus in 2011 was 
threefold: to establish distribution networks in new countries, to license local manufacturing, and to 
establish local production facilities. Although cigarette exports amount to very little of CNTC’s total 
production (5.08% as of 2013), exports have grown by over 60% from 2004 to 2013.  
Finally, CNTC has focused on establishing of foreign-based operations. Before the 1990s, foreign 
operations were limited to Asia. Fang (2016) notes that a change occurred in the mid-2000s, as CNTC 
looked to expand its networks with established TTCs. Trade agreements were signed with PMI and, 
before that, Gallaher to distribute CNTC’s brands in international markets. At the same time, Marlboro 
was legally allowed to be sold in China. CNTC also looked to source tobacco leaf from countries like 
Brazil, the U.S.A. and Zimbabwe (Fang, 2016). The logical next step would therefore be for CNTC to 
begin merger and acquisition proceedings on a number of international medium sized tobacco 
companies. 
The company has very few financial constraints, as they have not completed any costly acquisitions 
recently and are able to raise more funds if required. Similarly, CNTC would not violate any of the anti-
trust restrictions discussed earlier. This would not be the case for BAT, PMI and JTI. With no material 
presence in the form of brand production in other regions, CNTC would not be subject to a 
requirement for a geographical carve-up. Without any geographical limitations, the merger synergies 
would not be diminished, making IMB an even more attractive target. Finally, the move would suit 
CNTC’s recent strategy of expanding its international horizon in all respects. IMB would offer a 
competitive position in the European tobacco market, and would be a strong platform on which to 
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Figure 6: Chinese export value, brands, and number of tobacco companies 
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In summary, the acquisitions of the past 16 years have aimed to consolidate the tobacco industry. “Big 
Tobacco’s” strength has increased in all regions, as smoking prevalence slackened everywhere, except 
in China and some African markets. Purchases have been used to expand international operations or 
to consolidate within a particular domestic market. This has typically occurred through a snowballing 
effect on purchases, either from the liberalisation of state monopolies or from previously domestic-
focused companies beginning to look abroad. Larger acquisitions may continue in future, as IMB 
seems an attractive target. CNTC is the only competitor who could realistically purchase the company 
outright, however.  
The last 16 years have seen “Big Tobacco” conduct a number of acquisitions. Almost all of the material 
acquisitions have been in the same industry, and in similar geographic location to other established 
tobacco markets. Gains from these purchases are expected to affect revenues positively through 
vertical and horizontal synergies and, in turn, support the bullish sentiment seen in financial markets. 
Purchases have predominantly focused on the consolidation of well-established markets, where there 
are no state-imposed barriers. “Big Tobacco” has also moved to acquire firms in the e-cigarette 
industry. Corporate interest in the developed world has made IMB an attractive takeover target. 
However, developing tobacco markets have not been neglected, as the growing tobacco base has 
been accompanied by a number of acquisitions of lesser value. In terms of acquisition value per firm, 
PMI’s acquisitions in this period were considerably less in value than those of the other “Big Tobacco” 



















Chapter 4: Leverage 
The balance between debt and equity has direct implications for stockholder returns. The following 
section identifies theoretical reasons for this, and then discusses similar academic and empirical 
studies. It explores why varying leverage ratios are targeted, and how this impacts stock returns. The 
section then considers equity and debt changes for the “Big Tobacco” companies, and how these may 
have influenced their stock prices.  
To understand why higher debt might be attractive to shareholders requires consideration of the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). WACC represents the return required to satisfy a company’s 
debt and equity stakeholders, after having taken into account the effect of tax. Any return that a 
company achieves above this rate is owned solely by the shareholders. A lower WACC is therefore 
desirable from a stockholder point of view. The formula for this is:  
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =  
𝐸
𝑉
 × 𝑅𝑒 +  
𝐷
𝑉
 × 𝑅𝑑 × (1 − 𝑇𝑐)  
 
Where E is the market value of the firm’s equity, D is the market value of the firm’s debt, and V is the 
total value of E and D combined. Re represents the required return on equity, and Rd is the required 
return on debt. Tc is the corporate tax rate.  
Typically, Re is estimated by the CAPM31 formula, as investors are compensated for risk that cannot be 
diminished through the diversification of a well-balanced stock portfolio. Rd is estimated by using the 
current market rate of debt, and Tc is given. Each of these factors typically does not change 
substantially. 
The share of equity and debt can fluctuate with time. This mixture of debt and equity represents the 
firm’s capital structure. As debt is typically cheaper than equity funding, the optimal solution would 
seem to be to fund solely by raising debt, resulting in the lowest possible WACC. The implications for 
a debt-funded firm can, however, be dangerous. 
Korteweg (2010) explains the advantages and disadvantages of conservative and aggressive financing. 
In the first place, a more debt-focused firm gains the benefit of a tax shield. That is, debt offers a tax 
deduction on earnings, as it is factored down32 by the corporate tax rate. Similarly, it does not dilute 
shareholders’ ownership position and is therefore an attractive source of funding as it allows a set 
pool of net profits to be divided equally amongst a smaller pool of equity holders. It also counteracts 
the agency problem by reducing cash flows. Debt investors are considered more moderate in risk 
appetite than equity investors and, therefore, seek to limit the effects of the principal-agency 
problem. These advantages are offset by the direct costs of bankruptcy, as well as the indirect costs. 
These include debt overhang (the denial of further debt funding because of a company’s already large 
debt pool), asset substitution (where shareholders prompt a company to invest in riskier assets and, 
in turn, face a higher risk of bankruptcy), and asset fire sales (selling goods at a drastically reduced 
price to cover the costs of bankruptcy, or to raise funds in the short term because of a lack of other 
funding options). Korteweg (2010) notes that in more concentrated industries, these indirect costs are 
felt to a greater degree.  
                                                          
31 The Capital Asset Pricing Model. This refers to the formula: Re = Rf + β(Rm – Rf). 
32 Reference to 1 – Tc. 
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Korteweg (2010) goes on to conclude that there is, in fact, an optimal balance between debt and 
equity which is company specific. Net benefits are high for low-debt firms, but decrease when leverage 
becomes high. Similarly, smaller firms and those with higher profits have higher optimal debt 
financing. Optimal leverage is positively related to tangible assets, and negatively related to 
depreciation, profit volatility and market-to-book ratios. While “Big Tobacco” may have a large portion 
of goodwill (an intangible asset), each of the firms in question should not suffer from depreciation, 
profit volatility due to their geographical diversification, or market-to-book ratios.  
MacKay (2005) agrees with Korteweg (2010) with reference to leverage being higher and less 
dispersed in concentrated industries. This contrasts with more competitive industries, where whether 
a firm is an entrant, incumbent or existing firm determines its leverage ratio. Other firms’ actions, and 
their proximity to the sector’s capital/labour ratio, also are seen to influence a firm’s leverage ratio. 
Further factors include the median industry leverage, the market to book asset ratio, asset tangibility, 
profits, log of assets, and expected inflation, as has been shown empirically by Frank (2009). Empirical 
research supports the conventional trade-off theory of capital structure. One would expect, given the 
high concentration of “Big Tobacco”, that leverage has increased with time. Similarly, given the 
concentration of the market, “Big Tobacco” should be able to influence the sector ratios to a large 
extent, and therefore not be looking to move toward an industry-optimal debt ratio.  
Opler (1994) argues that highly leveraged firms lose substantial market share to their more 
conservatively financed competitors, especially during sector downturns. This is particularly applicable 
to “Big Tobacco”, for two reasons. One might expect to see a moderately-financed “Big Tobacco” 
sector as the firms should be well-hedged against sector downturns by the volume and diversity of 
sales. This may partly explain at least some of the acquisitions previously discussed. Given that 
smoking prevalence is falling on the whole and the cigarette industry is shrinking in some areas, it may 
be that “Big Tobacco” has looked to acquire its smaller competitors that have been highly leveraged. 
Although the exact financial position of each company acquired is not listed, it does seem a natural 
extension of “Big Tobacco’s” acquisition spree. Opler’s (1994) opinion on the indirect costs of leverage 
is confirmed by Korteweg (2010).  
Dittmar (2004) notes that in the case of a corporate spinoff (such as the formation of PMI in 2007), 
companies typically start with a lower leverage ratio than their parent company. The fundamental 
driver of leverage in the case of a spinoff is similar to that of a typical firm, and relies on growth 
opportunities. This is supported by conventional corporate finance theory, and also provides some 
insight into why leverage might be associated with a decrease in profits.  
Empirical evidence linking leverage and stock prices has been found. Rong-Jen (1991) finds that there 
is a positive and statistically significant relationship between stock price risk and degree of combined 
leverage (leverage that encompasses both operating and financial leverage). Too much debt is not 
without a negative side, however, as companies struggle to adjust to a more optimal debt ratio. Denis 
(2012) finds the process of debt removal is often lengthy, and is typically not the result of attempts to 
move toward an optimal debt ratio. Rather, it depends on whether or not the firm is generating a 
financial surplus with which to pay back the debt. Given “Big Tobacco’s” ability to generate strong 
financial results, debt spikes caused by new projects or acquisitions should taper off quickly. Similarly, 
they should experience a relatively stable debt ratio over the period, and any disparities should 
decrease with time.  
Typically, an investor looking to purchase a stock is interested in the stock because of either its growth 
nature or value nature. A value stock is seen as a worthwhile investment based on its deviation from 
its fundamental price, i. e. when a firm has its stock value suppressed by market forces, but still 
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maintains all the promise of tangible assets and strong cash earnings. Examples include firms such as 
Standard Bank, or Wells Fargo during the 2015-2017 period. A growth stock, on the other hand, is 
picked for its potential growth in earnings and size. Low dividends are a typical by-product of growth 
firms as they look to reinvest their earnings in the company. Typical examples include Amazon or 
LinkedIn over recent years.  
Ozdagli (2012) attempts to explain the source of the market value premium for the two groups. The 
study finds that market leverage (debt-to-assets ratio using market values) explains a large portion of 
the value premium. Typically, firms with a higher book-to-market value (value firms) have higher 
expected stock returns than their lower book-to-market ratio counterparts (growth firms). However, 
Zhang (2005) stresses that growth firms derive their value from growth possibility, whereas value firms 
derive theirs from assets in place. Growth firms therefore have expected returns higher than those of 
their value-oriented counterparts. This apparent contradiction is known as the premium puzzle and is 
the reason that more recent literature includes measures of assets and company size to predict stock 
returns. Ozdagli (2012) shows that leverage explains the market premium of value and growth firms, 
by weakening the relationship between book-to-market values and returns. With “Big Tobacco” well 
established, and having reliable earnings and dividend payments, the firms should be consistent, with 
debt financing matching that of value firms. However, some deviation may be found around larger 
acquisitions.  
Weill (2007) investigates whether institutional environment affects corporate performance. Access to 
credit and to legal advice is seen to materially affect leverage and, in turn, corporate performance, 
depending on the country. This should not influence “Big Tobacco” to the same degree, because of its 
high level of geographical diversification and access to credit from multiple sources.  
In summary, there are numerous advantages to pursuing an aggressively-geared debt to capital ratio. 
However, WACC may fall, and too much debt can be destructive to shareholder value creation. 
Typically, higher-leveraged firms are in a position of market power, but will be more susceptible to 
market fluctuations. Changes in the equity/capital mix will be investigated below.  
Data Manipulation & Interpretation 
All data and ratios for the figures and graphs in the rest of the chapter are drawn directly from 
Bloomberg Terminal.  The period is 1997 to 2016 where all data are available.  Where less data are 
available, the longest possible time period is used. Where manipulation is not discussed below, data 
are taken directly from Bloomberg.  
Long term(LT) & Short term(ST) Debt Percentage  
Long-term and short-term debt percentage represent the breakdown of total debt. Each is calculated 
as:  
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 %: 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
 
 
Bloomberg outlines LT and ST debt by value. These are converted to percentage here for the sake of 
comparison. The same applies to the calculation of short-term debt percentage, which is:  
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 %: 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡






This study uses debt/capital ratios to make a comparison between all of the “Big Tobacco” companies. 
PMI is running a negative net shareholders’ equity value, and it is therefore undesirable to use other 
ratios for comparison. IMB suffered from the same drawback in the 1999-2002 period.  
 





𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
Other Ratios 
A number of other ratios are also used for comparison. The current ratio, the dividend payout ratio, 














Overall, “Big Tobacco” has been increasing debt levels since before 2000. Figure 7 shows that BAT has 
had a slow but steady increase in their level of debt. IMB maintained moderate debt levels before 
aggressively financing their firm at the turn of the financial crisis in 2008. Lower interest rates, aimed 
at curbing the recession and exciting business growth, favoured companies that were in a financial 
position to take advantage of the low costs of debt. Given the low elasticity of demand for tobacco 
products and the historically strong levels of cash flow and earnings in the tobacco industry, it is 
intuitive that debt levels would rise during the recession. PMI, on the other hand, has maintained its 
aggressive practice of funding with debt. PMI has increased its dividend and pay-out ratios consistently 
since its spinoff in 2007, and the growing debt may in fact be a product of another corporate strategy 
(discussed in the equity section) rather than a causal factor of increased leverage and stock price 
growth. Finally, JTI seemed to follow the debt trends of “Big Tobacco” through 2008, but has since 
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Figure 7: Total Liabilities of “Big Tobacco” 
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provided equity has not fallen too. Initial inspection would show that JTI has not taken advantage of 
leverage to advance its shareholder value.  
Although liabilities may have increased, the mix of long-term and short-term debt may also affect 
WACC. If the yield curve is flat,33 a company has no incentive to move from short- to long-term debt, 
and vice versa. However, if the yield curve shifts from flat to increasing, companies that are able to 
shift their debt to more short-term focused maturities will be able to minimise their WACC. Longer-
term debt then protects against the short-term fluctuations of the market. “Big Tobacco” has 
remained relatively constant here. Throughout the past 16 years, the make-up of debt has shifted very 
little. A typical ratio of 80-20 for long-term to short-term debt was general during the period, with 
small variations for each firm. The only exception to the rule has been PMI. Since inception, they have 
increased their long-term debt from 79% to just below 90% of debt funding. Their mix of short-term 
to long-term debt has been the most volatile of all “Big Tobacco”. A 10% shift is therefore marginal. 
Their long-term debt is not too far off the industry average, and this increase is attributable to the 
tighter management of short-term payables and a higher quality of earnings than the rest of “Big 
Tobacco”. It is also important to remember that, although short-term and long-term debt carry 
different return requirements, companies in all industries will typically need to pay similar interest 
rates. With “Big Tobacco” maintaining a similar share of long-term to short-term debt over the period, 
they are unlikely to gain a competitive advantage from their selection of debt.  
 
Industry 
average 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 
ST Debt (%) 12,50 26,49 21,92 18,25 17,56 23,51 11,66 18,80 
LT Debt (%) 87,50 73,51 78,08 81,75 82,44 76,49 88,34 81,20 
Table 4: Long-term and short-term debt mix of “Big Tobacco” 
The debt to capital ratio concerns the weight of debt in the calculation of WACC. It takes into account 
all forms of debt, both long- and short-term. If all else is equal, a higher debt to capital ratio represents 
a more geared financial position (a riskier position from the shareholders’ point of view). A company 
can alter its debt to capital ratio by either issuing or buying back shares (increasing or decreasing the 
denominator), issuing debt (both short- and long-term), or retiring existing debt by paying off its 
principal amounts.  
                                                          





Debt to capital ratios have, for the most part, been consolidated over the period studied. IMB has 
corrected its excessively high debt to capital ratio, as debt values have been outpaced by equity 
changes (both share movements and the retention of income). Both BAT and JTI have remained 
relatively constant. PMI, on the other hand, has had a consistently rising debt-to-capital ratio, in 
contrast to its competitors. This supports this study’s earlier finding of absolute debt increases since 
the 2008 financial crisis, and may be supplemented by a decreasing shareholder pool. This has 
implications for WACC, as it indicates a narrowing return requirement for all of “Big Tobacco”. There 
are two plausible reasons for this. 
The first reason is a decrease in the number of new projects that require newly-issued debt. As the 
“Big Tobacco” companies are all very large, smaller projects that no longer require debt would shift 
capital ratios. At the same time, the increased concentration of the global tobacco market leaves “Big 
Tobacco” with few options for acquisition. So, although the acquisitions previously discussed have 
been growing in cost, the ones large enough to move capital ratios are few and far between. The latest 
example, the purchase of Reynolds American by BAT for nearly $50 billion, is the most significant 
purchase, and is still not expected to shift debt to capital ratios. BAT’s strong financial position, and 
initial minority interest in Reynolds, allowed BAT to raise funds by issuing further equity capital in 
combination with raising additional debt.  
Secondly, corporate strategies within the tobacco industry may have forced a consolidation of debt 
ratios. The acquisitions that were discussed earlier seem to support this, as companies find it more 
and more difficult to create shareholder value following contrasting corporate strategies. This 
indicates the maturity of the tobacco industry, with the stagnation of smaller opportunities and the 
consolidation of competitors. It is therefore important to discuss equity changes in detail (see below), 


























Debt/Capital and P/E ratios
BAT P/E IMB P/E JTI P/E PMI P/E
IMB D/C BAT D/C JTI D/C PMI D/C
Figure 8: Debt/Capital and P/E ratios of “Big Tobacco” 
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The P/E ratio has a number of applicable uses. The P/E ratio represents the number of dollars an 
investor is willing to pay for $1 of earnings with a particular company. A company like Facebook, for 
example, currently has a P/E ratio of 35. Investors see Facebook as having a large growth potential, 
and are therefore willing to pay extra to obtain common stock in the company. Stocks like Facebook, 
with greater potential for earnings and future income typically have a higher P/E, and are termed 
growth stocks. Apple, on the other hand, has reached a more mature phase of the business cycle, and 
has a current P/E ratio of around 17. Considered a more stable investment, Apple has been consistent 
in its earnings and profit margins. Investors look for shifts away from its fundamental stock value34 
when deciding to either buy or sell the share.  
Mapping the two ratios beside each other shows that the P/E ratio disparity has been compressed. 
Until the financial crisis of 2008, JTI was an outlier, valued as clearly a growth stock, and BAT and IMB 
were relatively in line as value stocks. This is to be expected, as JTI was in the process of expanding 
internationally through acquisition. Investors saw the acquisitions as expanding their current revenue 
streams into the international market, and the shift in approach helped support a higher price per 
share. The potential gains from international diversification were met equally by an issuance of 
shareholder equity and debt to maintain existing debt to capital ratios. Even after its purchase of 
Gallaher in 2007, JTI still has a significantly higher P/E than its competitors. It has, however, fallen 
more in line with its competitors, as the company’s domestic market has stagnated and it has already 
priced in the effects of its international growth.  
BAT has been the most consistent as a value stock, showing little in the way of P/E changes. There 
was, however, a noticeable spike in 2003. The purchase of Ente Tabacchi Italiani was the largest 
acquisition in Europe outside of the U.K.. at the time. It is plausible that investor sentiment grew as 
BAT made its biggest purchase outside of its domestic market in the post-2000 era, although this is 
not a definitive cause. International revenues were expected to climb as a result. IMB has been a 
relatively consistent outlier in the last 16 years. Initially the company focused on running a negative 
equity balance, and 16 years later it is running a far higher P/E ratio than its competitors. These 
differences will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. It should be noted, however, that a high 
P/E ratio is of relevance as the increased price could indicate the possibility of a buyout from one of 
the other tobacco firms. In terms of shareholder value creation, at least in the short term, the firm 
being purchased has the most to gain, as the offering firm often provides goodwill.35 With IMB’s strong 
earnings and manageable costs, and as it is the smallest of the “Big Tobacco” firms, speculation about 
acquisition by one of the other “Big Tobacco” firms has no doubt contributed to an inflated P/E ratio. 
This high P/E ratio is unlikely to be maintained, however, as the possibility of a merger has clearly 
already been factored into the share price. Finally, PMI has been consistent in investor sentiment. As 
the international division of Philip Morris, it already contained a well-diversified international portfolio 
of tobacco revenues. Although there have been a number of significant acquisitions, management 
decisions have maintained a consistent profit margin over the period in question. This helped shape 
investor sentiment to regard PMI as a value-oriented stock.   
Finally, while not shown here, price-to-book ratios for PMI matched those of a typical value firm. The 
ratio has accelerated in line with its price per share over the period in question. However, it suffers 
from a limited comparison. PMI has been running a negative balance of equity on its balance sheet. 
This has pushed up price-to-book ratios excessively, and they have become effectively infinite as the 
book value of the company fell. PMI’s price-to-book values can therefore not be compared to other 
                                                          
34 Valuation models based on income streams, assets and liabilities. 
35 The amount above the asking price that the acquirer pays for a company.  
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firms. This is the reason the ratio of debt to equity was not examined in the earlier part of this section. 
IMB has seen a similar trend, despite maintaining a positive value of equity recently. BAT and JTI have 
shown an increasingly high price-to-book ratio. This agrees with the theory of value firms as price 
appreciation follows firm maturity, in conjunction with market-size growth.  
Viewing the firms together shows that investor sentiment supports the capital structure of “Big 
Tobacco”. That is to say, the tobacco industry has moved toward a mature phase of its life. Higher 
debt levels are not necessarily rewarded with higher returns, as “Big Tobacco” has decreased the 
number of highly risky projects. This is in contrast to an industry in the growth stage, where new 
projects can often be more heavily funded by new debt issuances. Investors have drawn similar 
conclusions, as the possibility of significant purchases have become fewer. P/E ratios have fallen in-













The current ratio helps identify a company’s ability to cover its short-term liabilities with its current 
assets. If a company has a ratio below 1, it is likely that the company would be unable to pay back its 
short-term debt if this were to become due immediately. A ratio below 1 does not necessarily mean 
a company will go bankrupt, however, as there are many ways to obtain other financing. A ratio that 
is too high, on the other hand, may indicate a that resources are not being utilised, as under-gearing 
does not guarantee maximum shareholder wealth creation. “Big Tobacco” would be expected to show 
a healthy current ratio as the majority of for-sale, short-term assets are in various forms of tobacco. 
However, good management should mean that current financing would be utilised effectively, keeping 
the current ratio in check. The earlier breakdown of debt shows that the majority of funding is in the 
form of long-term debt.  
Industry averages have fallen over the period, with a shrinking of the current ratio gaps between the 
“Big Tobacco” firms. JTI and PMI have both shown decreasing ratios, while IMB and BAT have 
remained relatively constant. JTI and PMI have experienced an overall increase in debt over the 
period, which would help pull their current ratios down, ceteris paribus. At the same time, current 
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Figure 9: Current ratio of “Big Tobacco” 
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conjunction with a lower trade receivable value. As a whole, however, the industry tends to have a 
similar level of both short-term debt and assets on hand. 
While the ratios discussed above give some insight into the movement of debt levels, it is crucial to 
investigate changes in equity as well. Share issues or buybacks and income retention have lasting 













Share buybacks are one way a firm can choose to restrict its equity pool. A lower equity pool means a 
higher return for those holding stock in the company. This typically occurs in industries where firms 
can afford either to raise additional debt to buy back the shares or have enough free cash flow to 
cover their typical debt payments and purchase shares at the current market rate simultaneously. 
Firms that are still in their growth phase typically use income retention and newly-issued debt to 
expand their businesses.  
Both PMI and BAT have decreased the number of their shares outstanding through share buybacks 
over the past 16 years. JTI has also decreased its equity pool, but to a lesser degree. This is logical, 
given the restrictions on equity that the company has. As JTI is managed by majority state-owned 
capital, the only time that it has been willing to conduct share buybacks is when the government has 
offered its shares for sale. IMB, on the other hand, has issued more shares than it bought back over 
the period of this study. Given the company’s size before 2010, the acquisitions in 2001/02 (totalling 
$4.4 billion), and 2007/08 (totalling $18.9 billion) would have needed external funding. In order to 
keep debt to capital ratios intact, debt was issued in conjunction with an issuance of equity for both 
acquisitions. This explains the strong growth, of almost 100%, for shares outstanding over the period. 
Should IMB embark on further international acquisitions on a similar scale, they are likely to issue 
further shares. JTI will probably remain at its current level owing to its equity restrictions (due to 
unchanging government policy), and BAT and PMI are expected to remain stable given their strong 
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The dividend payout ratio is another way in which firms can choose to dilute the equity pool. If profits 
are not distributed by way of dividends, they are recorded in retained income, and thereby increase 
the equity portion of the balance sheet. Higher payout ratios are characteristic of more mature 
markets, as funds reinvested in the company do not give the same returns as in growing markets. 
Microsoft famously did not pay any dividend for a number of years, as its business expanded. Although 
the company was first listed in 1986, it paid its first dividends only in 2003, when it had over $43 billion 
in cash reserves. Ultimately, if there are fewer projects that are lucrative and require a large degree 
of funding, a mature firm is able to pay out more of the profits that it earned in a financial year. 
Over the period of the study, “Big Tobacco” showed particularly high payout ratios. A payout ratio of 
100% means that all profits are being paid out in the form of dividends, and no funds are reinvested 
in the business. Although this is far more volatile than the other ratios discussed, there has been a 
general upward trend in payout ratios. BAT is likely to lower its payout over time, as it is not 
sustainable to maintain a ratio of over 100%. JTI on the other hand, has maintained its slow but steady 
rise in payouts. This is to be expected, given its aggressive acquisitions and its relatively short time it 
has been in business, compared to its competitors. PMI is the most interesting of the “Big Tobacco” 
companies, as it has taken a strict approach to dividends. In fact, it is the only firm to have undertaken 
to increase its dividend year on year, and has not allowed a year to pass without the declaration of a 
dividend greater than that of the previous year. PMI started as an investor favourite with a payout 
ratio of 44%, which grew to 92% by the end of 2016. Profits have been strained lately, yet PMI has 
maintained its dividend strategy. Although margins are discussed in detail in the next chapter, it is 
important to note that with climbing dividends, it becomes more difficult to raise funds for new 
projects as a large portion of the company’s free cash flow becomes committed to dividend payments. 
Some investors have pointed this out, and argue that either more debt will be raised in future 
(throwing capital ratios into question) or dividends will have to flatten out. Finally, IMB has been the 
most volatile of the Big Tobacco group. Dividends should fall in line with its competitors relatively 
soon. Overall the payout ratios of “Big Tobacco” match those of a consolidating, mature industry with 
a strong cash flow. Growth in already high dividends does not represent a growing industry.  
In conclusion, “Big Tobacco” has followed a number of strategies in the effort to lower their cost of 
capital and maintain higher returns in the debt-equity sphere. Although the absolute value of debt has 

























































































BAT IMB JTI PMI
Figure 11: Dividend payout ratio of “Big Tobacco” 
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explain the value premium by increased liability ratios. Similarly, “Big Tobacco” has moved in ways 
contrary to those predicted by Mackay (2005), as leverage ratios fell despite a strong increase in 
worldwide tobacco concentration. This chapter does support the findings of Opler (1994), however, 
as “Big Tobacco” has been in a strong financial position to take advantage of smaller firms. Similar 
long-term and short-term debt ratios across the industry, debt to capital converging, and P/E ratios 
rising, all confirm that this is a mature industry consolidation. At first glance, “Big Tobacco” has 
reduced its holding of current assets, and is no longer covering its liabilities to the extent that it was 
two decades ago. This may indicate a lower cash turnover period and higher asset utilisation. With 
regard to equity, “Big Tobacco” has maintained, and in some cases increased, a very strong dividend 
payout ratio, and furthered its return to shareholders by aggressively decreasing the total shareholder 
pool. PMI may have difficulty maintaining this, as most of its free cash flow is now used for dividends. 
























Chapter 5: Margins 
This chapter investigates changes in the profit margin of “Big Tobacco” over the period 2000-2016. 
The various academic theories on the influence of changes in the margin on stock price movements 
are discussed, followed by an analysis of various applicable metrics to reveal trends. The meaning of 
these trends is then discussed.  
Fairfield and Yohn (2001) shows that breaking down profitability into asset turnover and profit margin 
does not help predict revenue. However, Fairfield (2001) did show that the change in profitability can 
be explained, at least partly, by disaggregating it into the change in asset turnover and the change in 
profit margin.  
Eriotis, Frangouli and Ventoura-Neokosmides (2011) show that firms use their investment in fixed 
assets as a strategic variable to affect profitability. With the narrowing of current ratio and other debt 
and liquidity ratios found by the present study, one would expect a continued narrowing of other 
profitability ratios, that is, a slow but steady decrease in current assets as “Big Tobacco” looks to 
increase asset efficiency. The quality of earnings should also increase, both relative to “Big Tobacco’s” 
investment in longer-term investments and its short-term turnover.  
Padachi (2006) addresses the impact of the management of short-term working capital management 
on profitability. The article shows a strong association between high inventories and lower 
profitability, which is enhanced by high investment in accounts receivable. Padachi (2006) uses 
inventory days, accounts receivable days, accounts payable days and the cash conversion cycle to 
identify levels of investment in inventories and receivables. We expect “Big Tobacco’s” profitability 
level not only to increase, but for a decrease in investment in both cash conversion cycle and accounts 
receivables to follow too. Lower inventory levels and better management of short-term working 
capital requirements will contribute to rising profit margins in the tobacco industry.  
Hagigi (1993) investigates the relationship between asset turnover and associated gains in 
international market share. This is particularly applicable here, as the tobacco industry requires 
massive investment in short-term assets and inventories, and operates at the international level. The 
study goes on to show that lowering profit margins does not by itself increase multinational market 
share, which relies on the cohesion of profit margins and increasing asset utilisation. An interesting 
point raised by Machin (1993) is that of the pro-cyclical nature of profit margins. The paper outlines 
how a firm’s profits fall just at the point that demand falls in a recession. This is relevant for any 
changes in profit margins over the period studied for “Big Tobacco”.  
Nissim and Penman (2001) investigate the use of profit to forecast for future returns. The paper 
concludes that ratios can be used to forecast fundamentals (drivers of future residual earnings, free 
cash flow, and dividends). This, in turn, can be used to predict revenue and net profits. One would 
therefore expect the quality of earnings to increase the upward pressure on profits, and consequently 
expected future earnings, leading to bullish investor sentiment.  
Kinney and Wempe (2002) seeks to confirm that inventory levels play a crucial role in firm 
performance. The paper shows that the positive effect is felt less by smaller firms. This finding is, 
however, irrelevant because of the scale of “Big Tobacco” production.  
Solimon (2008) outlines a Du Pont analysis and aims to bridge the gap between stock price analysis, 
stock returns, and their power as a forecaster. However, the Du Pont analysis conducted in this paper 
showed that there were abnormal returns and predictable forecast errors. It therefore can be used to 
supplement, not replace, other forecasting and analysis techniques. Du Pont is used to reveal 
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incremental information about stock returns through information on the operating habits of a 
particular firm.  
Goodstein (1992) notes that shocks to unit costs do play a statistically significantly role in determining 
profit margins. This is crucial to “Big Tobacco” as the firms may have some unit cost changes through 
merger synergies, as discussed in the acquisitions section above.  
Data Manipulation & Interpretation 
All financial ratios given below are taken directly from Bloomberg, for the period from the end of the 
1998 financial year to 2016. Where the full range of data were not available, data were gathered as 
far back as possible. The ratios have not been manipulated in any way, but for the sake of explanation 
and understanding their derivations are listed below.  
Net Income Margin (NIM) 
Net income margin represents a company’s ability to convert income into shareholder book value. 
While it does not reveal revenue growth, it does give an overarching view of the sector as a whole, as 
well as helping inter-competitor analysis.  
It is defined as: 
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =  








Margin 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 
BAT 4,86 8,88 26,25 21,26 19,34 25,58 31,51 
IMB 24,37 23,74 14,68 27,59 10,02 6,20 4,48 
JTI 1,61 0,97 -0,16 12,91 2,26 16,21 19,68 
Average  10,28 11,20 13,59 20,59 10,54 16,00 18,55 
PMI       26,47 26,68 27,47 26,11 
Average 10,28 11,20 13,59 22,06 14,58 18,87 20,44 
Table 5:Net Income Margin of “Big Tobacco” 
Between 1998 and 2007, net income margins have increased for most of the “Big Tobacco” companies. 
BAT has the largest increase, closely followed by JTI. PMI has remained fairly static over the period, 
but is still well above the average for the big four. IMB is the only “Big Tobacco” company to suffer 
decreasing net income margins. Their NIM was particularly high in 1998, when P/E ratios (see figure 
7) figures were also trading at exceptionally high rates. The drop in margins around the financial crisis 
is interesting, as they occur despite the relative inelasticity of cigarettes, “Big Tobacco’s” main driver. 
Similar results are obtained by calculating the EBITDA margin, the operating margin (discussed in the 
Du Pont analysis), and the pre-tax margin. 
These findings are in line with the finding that “Big Tobacco” has become increasingly influential in 
the tobacco market, buying up the majority of smaller firms and increasing their market control. With 
an increasing leverage in the tobacco market, firms are able to increase their margins without fear of 





2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Cigarette units 
5,77% -1,18% -1,16% -1,08% -1,55% -3,29% -2,77% -1,01% -1,13% 
Table 6: Average cigarette growth, of “Big Tobacco” 
 
It will be remembered from the previous chapter (figure 3) that cigarette consumption is decreasing 
on the global scale, with the exception of China. On the company side, the picture is similar. From 
2009 onwards, “Big Tobacco” has seen decreasing cigarette sales. While this does not cover all of their 
revenue, failing to sell more cigarettes would be a matter of concern. However, if a firm is able to 
pursue a strategy of increasing prices, this could offset the fall in cigarette volume. This holds true for 
an increase in net income margin (table 5) and negative cigarette growth (table 6). It is therefore 
concluded that “Big Tobacco” is pursuing a strategy of extracting gains through increasing margins, 
and not through a higher quantity of units sold.  
Impressive profit margins, although they contribute to stock price through increases in expected 
future income streams, are not the sole driver. They do not paint an accurate picture of profit margin 
generation or overall financial performance. The Du Pont analysis breaks down ROE into several facets. 
This helps not only to understand the use of profit margins, but also investments in assets and the 
influence of tax and interest payments on ROE. 
Du Pont Analysis 
A Du Pont analysis was conducted in order to understand the key drivers of ROE. The formula for ROE 
is: 





The Du Pont analysis breaks down ROE into a number of different constituents. The focus here will be 
on the most significant changes that have occurred in ROE. The formula for ROE with the definition 
given by Du Pont, is:  
=  𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 × 𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 × 𝐼𝑛𝑡. 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 × 𝑂𝑝. 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 × 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 













𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 =  
  𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑛
𝑃𝑟𝑒 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 
  
𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 =  
  𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑧𝑑 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑚𝑛 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑡. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =












  𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑧𝑑 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑚𝑛 
 
The first thing to note is that the interest margin has remained unchanged for the period in question 
for all of “Big Tobacco”. Despite a lightening of the debt burden, “Big Tobacco” has maintained similar 
levels of debt costs, at least with reference to revenues. As shown in the previous section, the long-
term and short-term debt mix has remained essentially the same. This implies that a smaller debt pool 
has become relatively more expensive. However, as revenues have increased over the period, interest 
costs have increased in proportion, and therefore do not represent a failure to transition toward an 
optimal balance of debt and equity. This is therefore unlikely to be a key driver of ROE, as all of “Big 
Tobacco” has remained consistent despite the movement in interest rates over the period. It does 
represent the efficient management of debt and its associated costs, as the gap between revenue and 
this aspect of costs has remained broadly the same.  
Interest 
burden 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 
BAT 63,89 83,37 90,80 88,37 88,27 90,43 89,33 
IMB 72,87 79,17 77,13 71,26 77,38 69,30 63,07 
JTI 95,73 90,78 90,68 97,98 91,36 98,13 98,52 
PMI       97,07 91,38 92,06 89,51 
Average 77,50 84,44 86,20 88,67 87,10 87,48 85,11 
Table 7: Interest burden of “Big Tobacco” 
The second factor in the Du Pont analysis, the adjustment factor, is also largely unchanged over the 
period in question. This can be explained by the fact that majority of once-off acquisitions and other 
significant changes to income will normalise with time. Although there are spikes around some 
acquisitions, all of “Big Tobacco” has converged to a factor of 1 over time. The leverage ratio of Big 







Tax burden 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 
BAT 55,72 47,15 77,66 69,22 65,61 67,32 74,43 
IMB 71,08 70,85 64,68 73,16 71,06 74,24 69,57 
JTI 52,73 36,47 103,08 62,51 50,15 67,43 72,93 
PMI       67,96 70,31 68,02 70,01 
Average 59,84 51,49 81,80 68,21 64,28 69,25 71,73 
Table 8: Tax burden of “Big Tobacco” 
The tax burden portion of the Du Pont analysis looks at changes in taxes relative to the firm’s revenue. 
There are two important outcomes. First, the initial outliers, BAT and JTI, have seen a noticeable 
increase in taxes relative to their respective revenue streams. Although the reason for this is not clear, 
it may be due to a changing taxation landscape. As the ratio is a book36 ratio, the measurement can 
be manipulated through the use of tax breaks and other deductions a particular firm is able to claim. 
Evidently, JTI and BAT have been unable to use tax breaks to their advantage and, therefore, have 
been facing a heavier tax burden. Incremental changes in depreciation, amortisation and other yearly 
deductibles have collectively contributed to the upward trend in the tax burden. It must also be note, 
that changes in tax rates can lead to changes in the tax burden. In the first place, “Big Tobacco” faces 
domestic tax rates which are liable to change. Similarly, changes in tax rates in a multitude of different 
countries will also affect “Big Tobacco’s” effective tax rate. Because of the array of “Big Tobacco’s” 
income streams, there are steady increases in overseas withholding taxes, as well as tax at standard 
rates other than domestic37 rates, which support the findings of the present study. Information on 
these taxes is found in the notes to financial reports. Exact values are not, however, reliably reported. 
Convergence is the second finding with respect to the change in the tax burden. As of 2016, there is 
very little variation in tax burden between all of the “Big Tobacco” firms. Whether this is because of 
similar asset management through depreciation and amortisation measures (as discussed below), or 
tax breaks as the result of asset management, is, however, difficult to say. 
The asset turnover ratio typically aims to describe how a given firm utilises its assets. A higher ratio 
implies that a firm is more efficient at generating revenue on a ‘per unit’ basis of assets. While not 
ideal for comparison across industries, the asset turnover ratio offers a direct means for comparison 
between competitors. There is a general downward trend in asset utilisation for “Big Tobacco” to note. 
Given that revenues have been increasing over the period, it must be that the asset base has been 
growing at a faster pace than revenues. The previous chapter found the current ratio to be falling, 
implying investment in short-term assets is decreasing. The only plausible explanation is that long-
term assets to have increased over the same period.  
Asset Turnover 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 
BAT 0,89 0,65 0,59 0,55 0,55 0,56 0,41 
IMB 0,93 0,87 0,45 0,41 0,48 0,52 0,45 
JTI 1,73 1,43 1,55 0,51 0,55 0,56 0,46 
PMI       0,79 0,78 0,82 0,75 
Average 1,18 0,98 0,86 0,56 0,59 0,62 0,52 
Table 9: Asset turnover of “Big Tobacco” 
                                                          
36 Defined by company accounting principles and measurements, as opposed to market forces. 
37 A tax line item in the notes to the income statement, divulging how tax is charged.  
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To confirm this, the percentage of total intangible assets (the sum of goodwill and other intangible 
assets) to total assets is calculated, as is the percentage of non-current assets to total assets.  
That is,  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 =  




In all cases, “Big Tobacco’s” non-current assets have increased. While the composition of the increase 
is firm specific, there are some interesting trends. As a proportion of total assets, non-current assets 
experienced strong growth during the period 2000-2006. This trend then stabilises at a much higher 
level that, although it is firm dependent, is far more significant than before.  
Intangible assets/Total assets 
  1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2013 
BAT 0,000 0,380 0,433 0,432 0,447 0,417 0,305 
IMB 0,000 0,178 0,552 0,550 0,684 0,612 0,633 
JTI 0,003 0,256 0,202 0,161 0,457 0,432 0,427 
PMI       0,309 0,400 0,317 0,266 
          
Non-current assets/Total assets 
  1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2013 
BAT 0,384 0,604 0,680 0,714 0,689 0,646 0,689 
IMB 0,151 0,318 0,654 0,694 0,769 0,705 0,770 
JTI 0,385 0,569 0,512 0,453 0,691 0,685 0,661 
PMI       0,535 0,608 0,558 0,522 
Table 10: Ratio of Intangible Assets and Non-Current Assets of “Big Tobacco” 
 
Secondly, the proportion of intangible assets has increased significantly since the early 2000s. This is 
true for IMB, BAT, and JTI. A very strong initial rise tapers off to a degree around the 2008-2011 period. 
Since then, the intangible assets line item has stabilised. In the case of PMI, intangible assets levels 
have remained similar since inception. This matches the rest of “Big Tobacco’s” acquisition trends at 
the time. Goodwill has grown to become typically the largest component of total intangible assets.  
It is important to remember that drastic changes in goodwill can have a causal movement on asset 
efficiency. The three factors in the creation of a company's goodwill include its value as a going 
concern, excess business income, and the expectation of future economic benefits. While a firm’s 
going-concern value and other income can be reliably estimated, the expectation of future economic 
benefits is more complex, and estimation can be above or below its real value. This can be 
problematic, especially for firms in the tobacco industry. When a “Big Tobacco” firm is doing the 
acquiring, estimates about the value of cigarette and non-cigarette tobacco brands can often be 
misleading. The expectation of revenue generation and synergies from mergers and acquisitions can 
be over- or under-estimated because of the large degree of branding presence in the tobacco industry. 
Often, conservative estimates are overshadowed and more generous offers made to entice the target 
firm to accept the offer. Regardless of the estimate, this extra amount is marked down as goodwill, 
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and forms part of the acquiring firm’s assets. This is a shortcoming of the Du Pont analysis in this 
context, and is exacerbated by the large number of “Big Tobacco’s” acquisitions over the past 16 years. 
This number may decrease in the future, as “Big Tobacco” struggles to find firms large enough to 
impact its balance sheet and income statements. Nevertheless, it seems intuitive that the growth in 
intangible assets through acquisitions has placed downward pressure on the asset efficiency of “Big 
Tobacco”.  
Operating margin describes how much a firm makes per dollar of sales. If the margin increases, the 
company is making more on a per-sale basis. Achieving bottom-line growth can occur by decreasing 
in costs, or increasing price. If a limited variation of these two factors is the only option available—
typically in highly competitive markets—firms resort to focusing on increased quantities. If 
competition is low, margins can increase. The operating margin of “Big Tobacco” is possibly its most 
interesting, yet contradictory, descriptive statistic. 
 
Operating 
margin 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 
BAT 13,65 21,32 37,13 34,76 33,40 42,02 47,39 
IMB 47,05 42,33 29,42 52,93 18,22 12,06 10,20 
JTI 3,20 2,93 0,01 21,07 4,93 24,49 27,38 
PMI       40,12 41,52 43,64 41,55 
Average 21,30 22,19 22,19 37,22 24,52 30,55 31,63 
Table 11: Operating margin of “Big Tobacco” 
In the case of BAT and JTI, we note a rise in operating margin over the period. PMI has been the most 
consistent since the firm’s inception. IMB, on the other hand, is the only one of the “Big Tobacco” 
companies to suffer from falling margins over the period. This continues the firm’s trend of being 
noticeably different in formation, size, and now, margins. This complicates the drivers of ROE in IMB’s 
case, as they do not have the advantage of increasing margins to offset the downward pull of asset 
turnover and the rise of the tax burden.  
Cash Conversion Cycle  
Although the earnings ratios derived above are based on the income statements and balance sheets 
of “Big Tobacco”, these ratios suffer the same drawbacks as any accrual-based accounting system: 
they do not represent cash inflows or outflows. Instead, they represent earnings occurring in the 
financial year, regardless of whether cash or credit was used. It is therefore crucial to inspect the cash 
flows of “Big Tobacco”, to ensure that these margins and revenue increases are not at the expense of 
quality of earnings.  
The “days sale outstanding” (DSO) measures the average number of days it takes a company to collect 
revenue after a credit sale is made. If a company has a low DSO then revenue collection is short, an 
advantage for quality of earnings, and, in turn, investors. Credit terms can vary drastically from 
industry to industry, and are only applicable for a competitor-on-competitor analysis. The retail 
industry, for example, typically has a DSO of zero, unless they offer their customers credit sales. 




The DSO is obtained by first calculating the total number of credit sales attributable to a particular 
financial year. This is used as the divisor for the accounts receivable year-end balance, the result of 
which is multiplied by the number of days in the financial year. That is,   
 
𝐷𝑆𝑂 =  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
 × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 
 
Days inventory outstanding (DIO) is the next metric needed to understand cash flow movements. It 
represents the average number of days a company holds its inventory before selling it. A lower number 
implies lower holding costs as the company moves inventory to sales on a more regular basis.  
 
𝐷𝐼𝑂 =  
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑
 × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 
 
The final part of the cash conversion cycle is the accounts payable days outstanding (DPO). This 
represents the average time it takes for a company to pay its invoices from suppliers. Using a higher 
DPO allows the firm to free up working capital for other short-term requirements. However, if the 
DPO is too high, the firm will face higher credit payments to suppliers.  
 
𝐷𝑃𝑂 =  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑
 × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 
 
The DSO, DIO and DPO all suffer from the problem of seasonality, as peaks and troughs are often 
created by fluctuations throughout the year. This issue is mitigated in the present study which covers 
a longer period of time and uses data taken at the end of the financial year. 
To understand the cash conversion cycle, one must consider the amalgamation of days sales 
outstanding, days inventory outstanding and accounts payable days. Giving each equal weight, a 
company can suffer from increases in DIO and DSO, but to use DPO to offset this. It is defined as: 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 = 𝐷𝑆𝑂 + 𝐷𝐼𝑂 + −𝐷𝑃𝑂 
 
DSO 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BAT 42,90 43,69 43,71 47,53 51,38 55,90 61,64 62,66 
IMB 65,97 66,06 65,98 69,69 70,18 71,65 68,65 60,25 
JTI 16,23 17,26 53,57 57,49 61,60 62,97 64,30 66,28 
PMI 43,35 40,96 36,44 39,60 43,51 48,17 46,19 43,05 
Average 42,11 41,99 49,92 53,58 56,67 59,67 60,20 58,06 
Table 12: Days sales outstanding of “Big Tobacco” 
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As in other areas, the results for “Big Tobacco” are somewhat divided. PMI has remained the most 
consistent in the number of days it to takes to receive cash after a sale is made. JTI and BAT have seen 
an increasing DSO, with varying volatility. Finally, contrary to what has been seen in the rest of the 
paper, IMB is the only “Big Tobacco” company to be performing favourably. IMB’s tightening of credit 
days gives them more opportunity to delay inventory days without affecting the net cash conversion 
cycle. Overall, however, the industry is increasing the number of days it takes to receive cash for sales 
made.  
DIO 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BAT 294,99 339,27 369,79 399,68 439,79 483,14 475,40 486,45 
IMB 111,90 113,44 113,86 123,36 129,50 134,86 138,50 142,48 
JTI 33,61 37,04 199,69 191,86 186,61 190,70 387,74 235,49 
PMI 381,73 329,26 280,93 301,13 329,50 322,44 332,55 340,82 
Average 205,56 204,75 241,07 254,01 271,35 282,78 333,55 301,31 
Table 13: Days inventory outstanding of “Big Tobacco” 
Days inventory outstanding presents a further problem for “Big Tobacco”. The ratio measures how 
long it takes to convert raw materials into sales. Despite falling inventory levels over the period, the 
ratio of inventory to cost of sales has continually risen. This again highlights “Big Tobacco’s” tendency 
toward a lower quantity but higher margin per unit. This means that although “Big Tobacco” 
companies are being less efficient with their inventory management, they are maintaining strong 
performance on a per unit basis. The DIO of “Big Tobacco” has regularly increased since 2009.  
The accounts payable days indicate how long it takes for a company to pay its creditors. Naturally, 
extending the time to pay has the advantage of freeing up cash flow and working capital. The 
disadvantage and direct cost is if there are terms outlining increased interest costs charged by 
suppliers, for example. In the case of “Big Tobacco”, the industry has slowly increased its accounts 
payable days. A DPO of around 30 is perfectly acceptable, as most firms settle debts early to avoid 
short-term debt costs. “Big Tobacco”, however, is quickly approaching the limit of what most creditors 
would consider ‘normal’ payment terms. This trend cannot be expected to continue without 
consequence. At the same time, it should be noted that “Big Tobacco” is using its strong liquidity 
position to maximise its working capital. “Big Tobacco” is not struggling to pay its creditors, but rather 
aims to maintain its cash conversion cycle by the offsetting movements in receivables and inventory 
days. All of the “Big Tobacco” firms show similar movements, albeit with varying degrees of volatility.  
DPO 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BAT 60,10 61,50 74,14 62,04 81,00 90,59 99,71 80,34 
IMB 45,02 47,15 45,14 43,60 41,38 47,06 48,11 40,20 
JTI 11,16 10,99 94,86 131,42 120,52 115,14 182,97 77,42 
PMI 35,86 31,13 32,49 34,86 38,37 50,01 49,96 54,43 
Average 38,03 37,69 61,66 67,98 70,31 75,70 95,19 63,10 
Table 14: Days payable outstanding of “Big Tobacco” 
As the cash conversion cycle represents the amalgamation of the three factors, it varies depending on 
the degree to which each has changed over time. “Big Tobacco” saw a decrease in the cash conversion 
cycle up to the 2009-2010 period, and has consistently increased since then. Driven predominantly by 
movements in days inventory outstanding, “Big Tobacco” has suffered from a slowing cash conversion 
recently. This is one of the few metrics to be diverging. PMI, JTI and IMB all show a moderately 
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increasing time to convert raw materials to cash, while BAT has shown aggressive growth in the cash 













Free Cash to Revenue and Dividends 
Finally, there is an interesting trend in “Big Tobacco’s” use of cash. As alluded to in the leverage 
chapter of this paper, “Big Tobacco” has increased its dividends. However, with a slowing cash 
conversion cycle, there may be interesting complications for free cash flow to the firm.  
 
𝐷/𝐹𝐶𝐹 =  
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
 
 
A dividend/free cash flow (D/FCF) of 1 implies the company is paying out all of its free cash flow per 
share. A ratio higher than 1 implies the firm is maintaining dividends that decrease their retained 
income pool.  
Free cash flow is calculated relative to total revenues, that is,   
𝐹𝐶𝐹/𝑅 =  




This ratio describes how much of a firm’s sales result in free cash flow to the firm. A value of 1 would 
imply that all sales are made on a cash basis. Figure 13 illustrates the dividend to free cash flow and 
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For ease of interpretation, the graph above is stacked. A value of 4 would therefore mean that all of 
“Big Tobacco” are paying out all of their free cash flow as dividends.  
 “Big Tobacco” has continued to show a strong cash to earnings per share, averaging around 30% of 
revenue. There has been almost no movement over the period. This has interesting implications, as 
despite the change in debt/capital ratios, margins, and company structure (through acquisitions), 30c 
for every $1 dollar of sales is earned in cash. Although revenue growth has slowed slightly, and 
cigarette units have fallen, “Big Tobacco” has maintained its cash inflow relative to revenue.  
The second finding is more problematic. The increasingly committed dividend policy that “Big 
Tobacco” has undertaken means that an increasing portion of cash flow is being dedicated to dividend 
payments. In 2016, for example, a value of 4 would mean that all of the “Big Tobacco” firms were 
paying 100% of their free cash flow out as dividends. With a value of 3.5, the industry is very close to 
paying out almost all of its free cash flow on an annual basis. It should be noted that PMI was added 
to the group in 2008, and this partially explains some of the jump in the ratio of cash flow to dividend 
payouts. While investors looking for safe and reliable payouts in the form of dividends might be happy, 
there is a growing concern about such a strong commitment to dividend increases. This presents a 
problem for any new projects or acquisitions that might require a large initial cash outflow. If the 
majority of cash funds are tied up in the yearly dividend increase, then “Big Tobacco” must look 
elsewhere for funding. A large enough project would require either a debt or equity issuance, which 
have both direct and indirect costs associated with them. These options are far more expensive than 
their cash-funded alternatives. “Big Tobacco” is therefore approaching a point where it must decide 
whether to commit to its dividend policy and face an increasing cost of capital, or to scale back its 
dividends to pursue future acquisition targets or projects that require funding. With an increasingly 
limited spectrum of possible acquisitions, it is unlikely that “Big Tobacco” will begin to use its cash flow 















Free cash flow to revenue and dividends to free cash flow 
BAT D/FCF IMB D/FCF JTI D/FCF PMI D/FCF Average FCF/R
Figure 13: Cash and dividend ratios of Big Tobacco 
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In conclusion, there are three crucial trends over the past 16 years. First, “Big Tobacco” has seen an 
increase in both its tax and interest burden ratios. However, “Big Tobacco” has simultaneously 
experienced an increase in its margins, which has helped to increase its bottom line on a per-unit basis. 
Asset efficiency has decreased, due to an increase in long-term assets, particularly goodwill and other 
intangible assets. This is consistent with the number of large acquisitions. Secondly, “Big Tobacco’s” 
cash conversion has increased. This has been predominantly driven by an increase in days inventory 
outstanding. Finally, “Big Tobacco” has increased its dividends per share aggressively. These levels 
approach the level of its overall free cash flow per share, where almost all cash received is being paid 


























Chapter 6: Market-Related Analysis 
This chapter focuses on market-side data to investigate the perception of “Big Tobacco”, using three 
different approaches to identify the market view of pricing, risk and revenue streams.  
With the study’s own estimates of fundamental stock pricing, a three-pronged approach is used to 
estimate share value. Two discount cash flow models (an EBITDA multiple approach and a growth 
model) are estimated, as well as a dividend discount model, and a sensitivity analysis is conducted for 
each estimation.  
A range of market-related multiples are looked at to investigate the way in which “Big Tobacco’s” 
growth prospects are viewed by the market, and whether or not these views are supported by the 
fundamental characteristics found earlier in the paper. Stock price (market capitalization) and 
enterprise value multiples are used to draw conclusions.   
Finally, risk is divided into its systematic and unsystematic components. The need for investors to be 
compensated only for risk that cannot be diversified away is taken into account, and whether or not 
“Big Tobacco’s” stock price climb is caused by an increase in risk. This involves an investigation of “Big 
Tobacco’s” stock standard deviation, beta, and value at risk. 
 
Present Value Stock Models 
EV/EBITDA 
The free cash flow to firm is gathered for the period 1999-2016 from Bloomberg. This is divided by the 
number of ordinary shares in circulation for each year, to attain the free cash flow per share. 2016 is 
used as the final year share value, and this is extrapolated linearly forward by three years. The terminal 
value is calculated from the end of 2019.  
To calculate an estimation of share value, the time value of money is accounted for by discounting 
each of the future cash flows to the present. Each of the three years forward is then added to the 
terminal value.  
The formula is:  













Where Fx denotes the appropriate free cash flow for that period. r is the required rate of return,38 and 
R is the residual value of the firm. R is calculated in this case, by multiplying the EV/EBITDA multiple 
by the final year’s free cash flow per share.  
That is,  




Changes in the EV/EBITDA multiple occur on a year-on-year basis, and therefore require a sensitivity 
approach. Using a single value could privilege over- or underestimates of share values. Only the 
                                                          
38 The required rate of return used here is WACC. 
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median value is reported here. Note that the upper and lower ranges of EV/EBITDA multiples used are 
taken directly from the values assigned to the firm over the 2010-2016 period.  
Growth model 
The growth model uses a similar approach to calculating share value. The same timeline for free cash 
flow per share is used, which is extrapolated forward the same length of time.  
To calculate an estimation of share value, the time value of money is accounted for by discounting 
each of the future free cash flows to the present, and adding to it a terminal value.  
This uses the formula:  














Where Fx denotes the appropriate free cash flow for that period. r is the required rate of return and 
TV is the terminal value of the firm.  
TV is calculated, in this case, by letting the time period of free cash flows tend to infinity. It is therefore 






Where g is the growth rate of free cash flow. This is calculated by finding the compound average 
growth rate (CAGR) of free cash flow from 2010-2016. As with the EV/EVITDA multiple approach, a 
range of values for g is used to ensure that this approach is not susceptible to over- or 
underestimation. Again, only the median values are reported.  
Dividend discount model 
Possibly the most straightforward of the share estimation techniques, the dividend discount model 
(DDM) views shares as cash generating investments, and values them as the sum of all future 
payments.  
The share value is calculated by gathering dividends per share for the period 1999-2016. To calculate 
an estimation of share value, the time value of money is accounted for by discounting each of the 
future cash flows to the present. A two stage DDM is used. The first stage is generated with a three 
year horizon. At the end of the three years, the perpetuity value is calculated assuming a constant 
growth rate. This is similar to the earlier growth model, but cash flows are in the form of dividends.  
That is,  














Where Dx denotes the appropriate dividend for that period. r is the required rate of return and TV is 
the value of the final dividend in perpetuity.  
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TV is calculated in this case by letting the time period of free cash flows tend to infinity. Again, the 





Where g is the growth rate of dividends. This is calculated by finding the compound average growth 
rate (CAGR) of dividends flow from 2010 to 2016. As with the EV/EVITDA multiple approach, a range 
of values for g is used to ensure that this approach is not susceptible to over- or underestimation. Only 
the extreme values (bearish and bullish) are reported.  
 
  EV/EBITDA   Growth model   Actual price 
Company Lower Upper  Lower Upper   
                
BAT USD 25,81 USD 38,02  USD 16,85 USD 19,99  USD 57,05 
IMB USD 33,35 USD 52,68  USD 33,35 USD 42,13  USD 51,54 
JTI USD 10,41 USD 19,49  USD 15,95 USD 30,25  USD 32,96 
PMI USD 57,46 USD 84,53   USD 55,76 USD 106,28   USD 91,49 
Table 15: Stock price estimates of “Big Tobacco” 
The results show a relatively clear conclusion. Using EV/EBITDA, all the lower bounds of the estimates 
are well below the actual share price. This approach assumes a worst-case scenario in terms of 
financing costs (required rate of return), as well as a worsening of the enterprise value back to 
2011/2012 levels. Increased financing costs to this degree are not expected for all of “Big Tobacco”, 
and therefore the true stock price is likely to be above the lower bound. The upper bound of the 
EV/EBITDA estimates assumes a slight improvement in terms of financing costs, and a continuation of 
current growth in EV multiples. Here, the results are mixed. In the case of BAT, JTI and PMI, actual 
prices are well above the more generous estimates. IMB is the only firm that has an estimate above 
its current share price. This is attributable to two factors: in the first place, IMB has had spikes in its 
free cash flow to firm per share recently. A healthy free cash flow (above that of BAT, for example) 
means that, per share, the present value of future cash flows is higher. Secondly, IMB has controlled 
its cost of capital well. This helps provide future cash flows to maintain its present value. It should be 
remembered that the estimation relies on the EV/EBITDA multiple to generate the terminal value of 
the firm. EV is driven by market prices, and therefore has been seen to appreciate with time. The 
appreciation can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Higher EV is associated with a higher EV/EBITDA 
multiple, which causes estimates of share price to become higher. The moment the market decides to 
re-evaluate the EV of “Big Tobacco”, estimates of their true share price change. This is a weakness of 
this approach which is worth noting. The growth model, as well as dividend discount model, do not 
suffer from the same ‘market-related’ pricing drawbacks. Overall, EV/EBITDA suggests a continued 
bullish sentiment in the market.  
Similar results, but to a further degree, are seen using the growth model. All lower bounds are well 
below the actual share price, as are the majority of upper-bound estimates. PMI stands out here, 
owing to its continued focus to increase its free cash flow. Although the majority of the free cash flow 
per share is being paid out in dividends (which has implications for the DDM model), PMI’s quality of 
earnings and lower required return have helped advance PMI’s actual share price to within the 
boundaries of the best and worst-case scenarios. BAT, on the other hand, has been brought down by 
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its higher required return. The lower required returns for JTI and IMB are help bring the estimates 
here close to the true share price. JTI’s modest EV/EBITDA in the previous model is seen to be reversed 
here. When company fundamentals instead of market related factors are relied on, JTI is seen to be 




model         
Actual 
price 
  Stage 1  Stage 2 Sum     
      
BAT USD 8,29 USD 12,81 USD 21,10  USD 57,05 
IMB USD 8,38 USD 15,46 USD 23,84  USD 51,54 
JTI USD 5,21 USD 17,99 USD 23,20  USD 32,96 
PMI USD 16,25 USD 57,51 USD 73,76   USD 91,49 
Table 16: DDM model estimates of “Big Tobacco” stock price 
 
The DDM model looks only at dividends paid by each firm, and not at any of the fundamentals of the 
company. PMI has strong results here. This can be attributed to its commitment to increase dividends 
year on year, and to its lower required return, which increases its present value of future payments. 
BAT, on the other hand, is particularly hindered by this approach as its stocks command a higher return 
to investors. IMB and JTI have lower dividends than BAT or PMI, helping depress the estimates using 
this approach.  
Bullish sentiment is seen to favour BAT particularly. Discussion of the purchase of RJ Reynolds Tobacco 
no doubt has had some effect on BAT’s share price. Uncertain exactly how much goodwill would be 
paid for the purchase, and how much synergy would come from the two merging companies, investors 
may stray from fundamentals. This might explain at least some of the share price’s deviation from the 
estimates given by this approach.    
Each of these three approaches indicates one of two things. On one hand, the market may be 
overpricing “Big Tobacco”. As in most financial bubbles, actual share prices exceed fundamental 
estimates. In this case, estimates are above even market-related estimates of the company. A typical 
bubble goes through phases of growth and eventually reverses itself, tending toward fundamentals. 
However, if one looks at stock market prices, growth has been steady, and fundamentals have not 
been lagging behind. This is unlikely to be a case of stock market overpricing. On the other hand, it 
may be that the market still expects the growth seen in the 2000-2016 period to continue. By using 
more aggressive growth estimates, and simultaneously relaxing return requirements, estimates could 
overshoot “Big Tobacco’s” share price. This will be discussed further below.  
 
Multiplier Models 
The data is not manipulated for multiplier models. Instead, all values are taken directly from the 
Bloomberg terminal. P/E, P/Book, P/Sales and P/Free cash flow, market capitalization, and EV 




Company   2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
 P/Sales      
BAT  1,00 1,74 2,96 3,98 5,82 
IMB  2,43 2,88 1,50 1,55 2,69 
JTI  0,34 0,33 2,31 2,18 3,21 
PMI       3,50 4,51 5,32 
 EV/EBITDA      
BAT  5,82 5,63 11,55 12,29 19,71 
IMB  7,71 9,35 13,00 9,66 14,74 
JTI  5,42 3,09 10,14 8,01 9,84 
PMI       8,79 10,82 14,58 
 EV/FCFF      
BAT  9,14 14,30 14,52 19,45 25,77 
IMB  14,50 14,99 15,68 18,93 17,99 
JTI  8,82 7,98 18,14 9,90 25,40 
PMI       13,60 17,61 21,96 
Table 17: Market ratios of “Big Tobacco” 
The analyses of market-related ratios all point toward the same conclusion. The market has 
increasingly had a bullish view of “Big Tobacco” over the past 16 years. This means that relative to 
fundamentals, “Big Tobacco” has seen impressive growth.  
“Big Tobacco’s” share price and enterprise value have increased more than proportionally to its 
underlying fundamentals. The table above shows how, per dollar of sales, an investor is now willing 
to nearly six times what they were willing to pay in 2000 for a share. The same holds true when 
accounting for the market value of debt in the EV multiples. On average, investors are paying between 
two and five times as much as they were per dollar of EBITDA, and between two and four times as 
much per dollar of free cash flow to the firm.  
Again, this does not necessarily point to overpricing. It may be a combination of reliable growth and 
the fact that “Big Tobacco” has completed its transition to a mature market. Other P/E multiple and 
EV multiple ratios indicate this as well. P/E and EV multiples often increase as firms transition from 
being a growth to a value firm, and this can be seen for “Big Tobacco” as well. However, the market 







To calculate the standard deviation of risk, daily stock prices were gathered for each “Big Tobacco” 
firm for the period 2000-2016, and in the case of PMI, from 2008-2016 only. DataStream instead of 
Bloomberg is used here.   
Standard deviation is calculated by using: 
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𝜎 =  √
∑(𝑥𝑖 −  𝜇)
2
𝑛 − 1 
  
 
Where µ is the mean of the returns, n is the number of observations over the period, and xi is the 
return for the current period.   
For simplicity, daily standard deviation is converted to monthly using:  
𝜎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 =  𝜎𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 × √20 
 
Beta 
The beta of a stock is a measure of volatility. It aims to identify how a stock reacts to movements in 
the market. A value of more than 1 indicates the stock will move more than the market. A higher value 
demands higher compensation because of the higher associated risk.  
To identify a stock’s beta, daily stock returns are regressed against an appropriate proxy for the 
market. Typically, this is a market-weighted index.  
The formula is: 
𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = 𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 +  𝜀 
 
Where ystock return represents the return of each of the “Big Tobacco” firms. Xindex represents the value 
of the applicable market index during the same period. The appropriate market index is used for each 
stock. For example, in the case of PMI (whose headquarters are in the U.S.A.) the S & P 500 is used to 
track changes in the market; for BAT, the FTSE 100. The same coefficients can also be pulled directly 
from Bloomberg terminals to provide confirmation.  
 
Value at Risk (VaR)  
The purpose of Value at Risk is to identify the maximum expected loss given a level of confidence. 
Riskier stocks will have higher expected losses than their less risky counterparts. Investors therefore 
demand a higher return to compensate for the increased risk.  
Value at Risk is calculated for each “Big Tobacco” company, as well as each of the market-weighted 
indices for reference. This involves first gathering each of the daily stock prices for the period 2000-
2016. Daily percentage returns for each day are then calculated, as are the average return for the 
period and the standard deviation of returns. The data are then normalised, with a 95% one-sided 
confidence interval. For the sake of simplicity and interpretation, a value factor of $100 is used.39  
It should be noted that the VaR measurement assumes a normal distribution. While this may be the 
case, many investors find that the tails of the distribution occur more frequently than in a normal 
distribution. A redeeming feature of this approach, however, is that the returns have been observed. 
Returns used in this paper have not been simulated, although many investors use Monte Carlo 
                                                          
39 Most financial indicators use value at risk for a portfolio of stocks, and therefore have varying basket values. 
In those contexts, VaR is compared to the total basket value.   
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simulations to calculate potential disadvantages. Rather, these losses have already been observed 
over the 2000-2016 period. Although past returns are no indication of future returns, if one assumes 
the market is efficient the VaR approach does give an idea of potential risks with fair confidence.  
 
Company Std. deviation   Beta   Value at risk 
          Daily Monthly 
       
BAT 0,015918653  1,26  2,549431 11,4014 
IMB 0,015066395  0,9  2,422268 10,83271 
JTI 0,020743456  0,74  3,358292 15,01874 
PMI 0,013806424  0,86  2,234559 9,993253 
       
S & P 500 0,012185676   1   2,00574 8,96994 
Table 18: Risk estimates of “Big Tobacco” 
 
Results from Table 18 above show that “Big Tobacco” has a standard deviation mildly above that of 
the overall market. The S & P 500 is listed in the table, but the same holds true for the other major 
indices used. It is important to note that this standard deviation is first differentiated, as the stock 
data has a unit root. This means that the standard deviation here is percentage based, not based on 
absolute value. This lack of risk has implications for the pricing of the asset. Although most pricing 
models use variants of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), standard deviation gives us insight into 
stock volatility unrelated to other stock index movements.  
The beta estimates reach a similar conclusion, that “Big Tobacco” is not typically reactive to market 
movements. For example, a 10% increase in the market value of an index like the S & P is associated 
with a 8.6% increase in the case of PMI, ceteris paribus. “Big Tobacco” has an important advantage 
over other stocks – its stock price does not overreact to shifts in the market. It does not demand a 
higher return as it offers some defence against regular business cycle movements.  
The VaR estimates confirm other estimates in this study. All of “Big Tobacco” promises little more risk 
than the overall market does. Although JTI is the riskiest in terms of monthly downside, this is not to 
say the stock is a risky asset. Rather, it has the lowest beta and in some cases the least association 
with the market, but has more volatile movements. As VaR was estimated in terms of percentage, it 
can be concluded that BAT will not lose more than 11.4% in a month, with 95% confidence. This is low, 
when one assumes that the market as a whole would lose 8.9% given the same confidence interval.  
In summary, this chapter highlights three key elements. Market perceptions may either be overpricing 
tobacco, or expect past trends to continue into the foreseeable future. This can be seen in the gap 
between share price estimates and the actual share prices. Although these estimates are subject to 
assumptions, sensitivity analysis allowed a broader range of possible true share values. Far more 
extensive stock evaluation methods exist, but the purpose here was not to look forward and define 
future stock movements, but rather to find market-related approaches to the current pricing of “Big 
Tobacco” stocks. Secondly, the bullish trend of “Big Tobacco” has continued for the past 16 years. 
Price and enterprise multiples have been seen to increase relative to “Big Tobacco’s” underlying 
fundamentals. This follows the maturity of the tobacco industry. While these multiples are not in the 
hundreds (and therefore expecting exponential growth), the ratios suggest that the upward 
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momentum will continue. Finally, there is a lack of associated risk with “Big Tobacco” stocks. While 
past performance is not an indication of future gains, it should be noted that “Big Tobacco” is well 
diversified in international markets and generally offers a shield against sharp economic movements. 
Barring aggressive changes in corporate strategy, it is unlikely that any of the stocks will acquire an 





















The purpose of this paper was to understand some of the key reasons why “Big Tobacco” has done 
consistently well despite changes in the tobacco industry. By focusing on acquisitions, margins, 
leverage and market-related ratios, the trends of each of the firms can be seen. These trends in “Big 
Tobacco” movements are consistent with financial theory.  
“Big Tobacco” has committed to a strategy of consistently increasing margins and gaining market 
share through acquisitions to offset a decline in cigarette sales. The big five have recently become the 
big four through BAT’s acquisition of RJ Reynolds, and there may be further consolidation in the 
industry if CNTC looks to expand its reach into Europe. Investors stand to gain the most as large 
payments for goodwill are typically associated with acquisitions.  
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At the same time, “Big Tobacco” has maintained its dividend growth, despite worsening free cash 
flow/dividend ratios. There has also been a slowing cash conversion cycle throughout the industry. 
Debt level changes and share buybacks were seen to help promote positive ROE values. PMI is the 
only one of the “Big Tobacco” firms to follow a negative equity strategy, which required the use of 
other accounting ratios for the sake of comparability.       
Finally, the evaluation of free market ratios shows that investors still expect to see growth in “Big 
Tobacco”. Price and Enterprise value ratios have increased over the 2000-2016 period. Although the 
stocks offer impressive low risk/volatility measures, it is difficult to see the same growth occurring in 
the future. Post-merger synergies and growth in the vaping and logistic markets are redeeming factors 
on an otherwise slowly worsening balance sheet.  
“Big Tobacco” has used its market position well, making the most of investment opportunities on a 
global scale and optimising debt and cash flows. This practice has made the firms a good stock in which 
to invest. With key fundamentals falling over time, however, management will have difficulty 
replicating the revenue and margin growth of 2000-2016. Tax reform and adverse health awareness 
are unlikely to alleviate the stress on “Big Tobacco” fundamentals.  
Further research into country-specific corporate data could be beneficial. This paper only had access 
to public information which is likely to have been aggregated to the global level. Changes in costs, 
revenues, and margins might show varying differences if data collected was regionally, or even for 
each country separately. Similarly, further information on the growing vaping market from “Big 
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Appendix 1A: List of acquisitions 
 
British American Tobacco: 
BAT Company Targeted Acquisition 
type 
Country  Region Cost associated 
1999 Rothmans 
International  
Acquisition England  European 
Union 
$7.55 billion 
2000 Imperial Tobacco 
Canada40 
Acquisition Canada Americas $6.8 billion41 
2001 Gurel Group  Joint 
venture 
Turkey EEMEA $200 million 




Egypt EEMEA $30 million 
 Vintaba  Joint 
venture 
Vietnam Asia $65 million 
 BAT South Korea Company 
creation 
South Korea Asia $80 million 
 Taesong-BAT Joint 
venture 
North Korea Asia $7.1 million 
2003 Ente Tabacchi Italiani Acquisition Italy European 
Union 
$2.3 billion 
2004 Brown & Williamson 
merges with RJ 
Reynolds  
Merger U.S Americas 42% of $10 
billion company 
2008 Tekel, the Turkish 
state tobacco 
company  
Acquisition Turkey EEMEA $1.72 billion 
 Skandinavisk 
Tobakskompagni 
Acquisition Denmark European 
Union 
$2.185 billion 
2009 Bentoel Acquisition Indonesia Asia $494 million 
2011 Protobaco  Acquisition Colombia Americas $452 million 
201242  CN creative  Acquisition U.K. European 
Union 
$65 million 
2013 CTBAT Joint 
operation 
Hong Kong Asia Classified in fin 
reports43 




Myanmar Asia $50 million 
 BAT Bangladesh Acquisition 
by share 
increase 
Bangladesh Asia $37 million 
2014 Lorillard44 Acquisition U.S.A Americas $4.7 billion 
                                                          
40 This has no association with Imperial Brands 
41 Imperial Tobacco becomes a wholly owned subsidiary through the purchase of IMASCO 
42 BAT also announces that it will help fund the purchase of Lorillard by Reynolds American. This is discussed in 
detail in the Reynolds American portion of this paper.  
43 BAT does not disclose a cost as this is a joint operation with China Tobacco. Instead, sales and profits are 
recorded in the Asia-Pacific region as continuing operations. BAT maintains its 50% of all income from CTBAT. 
44 BAT maintained its 42% share in Reynolds American by assisting in the purchase of Lorillard Tobacco 
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2015 Souza Cruz Acquisition Brazil Americas $2.4 billion 
 TDR Acquisition Croatia EEMEA $604 million 
 CHIC Acquisition Poland European 
Union 
$106.6 million 
 Blue Nile Cigarette 
Company 
Acquisition Sudan EEMEA $60 million 
2016 Ten Motives Acquisition UK European 
Union 
$72 million 
2017 BAT is set to acquire 
the remaining share of 
Reynolds American  



























Phillip Morris International:  
PMI Company Targeted Acquisition 
type 
Country  Region Cost associated  
2001 Headquarter transfer 
to Luasanne, 
Switzerland 
   - 
2003 PMI Philippines Creation Philippines Asia $300 million  
 Papastratos Acquisition Greece European 
Union 
$386 million 
 Izhora plant Creation Russia EEMEA $330 million 
 Fabrika Duvana Acquisition Serbia EEMEA $47.3 million 
2005 Sampoerna Acquisition Indonesia Asia $5billion45 
 Coltobaco Acquisition Colombia Americas $310 million 
 China National 
Tobacco Corp  
Joint 
operation 
China Asia Joint 
operation46 
2006 ITLJ Acquisition Dominican 
Republic 
Americas $427 million + 
share in ELJ 
beer 
subsidiary47 
 Murratti and 
Ambassador brands 
from BAT 
Acquisition International48 - $115 million + 
Benson & 
Hedges rights in 
some areas 
2007 Lakson Tobacco Acquisition Pakistan EEMEA $339 million 
 Grupo Carso49 Acquisition Mexico Americas $1.1 billion 
2008 Rothmans Inc Acquisition Canada Americas $1.9 billion 
 Interval Trademark50 Acquisition U.K. European 
Union 
$407 million 
2009 Swedish Match 
South Africa 
Acquisition South Africa EEMEA $256 million 




Classified in fin 
reports51 
 Protabaco Acquisition Colombia Americas $452 million 
 Alliance One, and 
Universal Leaf 
Tobacos - purchasing 
of tobacco leaf 
supply 
Acquisition Brazil Americas $83 million 
 Petteroes Tobacco  Acquisition Norway European 
Union 
$209 million 
2010 Fortune Tobacco 
Corp52 
Acquisition Philippines Asia $1.17 billion 
                                                          
45 Initial offer of 40% of outstanding shares, plus 57% from the public tender offer executed concurrently  
46 Covers the distribution and manufacturing of the Marlboro brand in China  
47 E. León Jimenes, C. por. A, a Dominican Republic business focusing on cigars and breweries  
48 Areas outside of BAT primary interest 
49 Furthering its interests; not starting a new venture 
50 Purchased from Imperial Tobacco 
51 PMI records half of all economic activity in its financial statements. 
52 Resultant company named PMFTC Inc 
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2011 Vintaba  Joint 
venture 





Acquisition Jordan EEMEA $42 million 
2013 Grupo  Carso Acquisition Mexico Americas $703 million 
 Megapolis – part 
purchase of 20% 
Acquisition Russia EEMEA $750 million 
 AITA – 49% interest54 Acquisition Algeria EEMEA $625 million 

























                                                          
53 PMI records half of all economic activity in its financial statements. 




Japan Tobacco International: 
JTI Company Targeted Acquisition 
type 
Country  Region Cost associated 
1999 RJ Reynolds 
International 
operations 
Acquisition U.S.A Americas $7.8 billion 
2006 Duvanska Industrija 
Senta 
Acquisition Serbia EEMEA $35 million 
2007 Gallaher Group PLC Acquisition U.K. European 
Union 
$14.25 billion 
2009 Kannenberg  Acquisition Brazil Americas  
 KBH&C Acquisition Brazil Americas $230 million55 
2011 Ploom Minority 
stake 
acquisition 
Japan Asia Undisclosed 
 Haggar Cigarettes Acquisition Sudan EEMEA $450 million 
2012 Gryson NV Acquisition Belgium European 
Union 
$600 million 
2013 Al Nakhla** Acquisition Egypt EEMEA Estimated $500 
million56 
 Megapolis 20% share Acquisition Russia EEMEA $750 million 





2015 Ploom tech58 Acquisition U.S Americas Undisclosed 
 Arian Tobacco Acquisition Iran EEMEA Undisclosed 
 Logic Acquisition U.S Americas Undisclosed 
2016 Natural American 
Spirit trademark 
Acquisition U.S Americas $5 billion 
 National Tobacco 
Enterprise Ethiopia 
Acquisition Ethiopia EEMEA $510 million 
 Fluxo Brasil 
Distribuidora do 
Produtos 
Acquisition Brazil Americas Undisclosed 










                                                          
55 This is the sum total for acquisition of both KBH&C and Kannenberg 
56 JT quoted the acquisition as being a multiple of Al Nakhlas EBITDA 
57 Multiple of E-Lites yearly revenue of $26 million 




IMB Company Targeted Acquisition 
type 
Country  Region Cost associated 






 Baeln Group Acquisition Belgium  European 
Union 
$124.5 million59 






Acquisition Germany European 
Union 
$4.2 billion  
 Tobaccor 25% share Acquisition France European 
Union 
$63 million 
2004 CTC Tube Company Acquisition Canada Americas $43.5 million 





Acquisition U.S Americas $1.9 billion 
2008 Altadis Acquisition Spain European 
Union 
$17 billion 
 Logista60 Acquisition Spain European 
Union 
$1.3 billion  
2009 Jr Cigar & MCM 
Management61 
Acquisition U.S Americas $81 million 





Acquisition U.S Americas $75 million 
 Cambodia 
distribution62 
Acquisition Cambodia Asia $66.4 million 
2015 Reynolds American 
blu, and four other 
brands 








                                                          
59 Total cost of EFKA and Baeln 
60 Those shares that were not originally owned by Altadis at the time of acquisition; the remaining 40% 
61 Those shares that were not originally owned by Altadis at the time of acquisitions; the remaining 49% 
62 Imperials former distribution partner 
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IMB cigarette volume       
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
UK 22,9 21,4 20,8 21,1 19,2 18,7 
Germany 20,4 19,5 23,9 23,2 23,4 22,6 
Spain     30,3 25,3 20,8 18,7 
Rest of Western 
Europe 19,6 18         
Rest of EU     59,3 59,6 57,8 53,4 
United States 7,1 14,2         
Rest of world  130,3 134 174,1 167,6 168,6 168,8 
Americas     13,8 11,9 12,3 10,3 
Growth markets             
Returns markets             
Total 200,3 207,1 322,2 308,7 302,1 292,5 
 
 
JTI cigarette volume           
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
North & Central Europe 39,3 50,8 47,5 49 49,1 49,9 50,4 51,6 53 54,2 
CIS+ 195,1 219,7 214,6 203,6 197,8 197,44 185,2 165,7 152,5 141,4 
South & West Europe 55,2 64 64,5 63,2 60,8 62,65 60,9 59,8 63,2 65,2 
Rest of the World 85,7 117,7 108,4 112,7 118 126,5 119,8 120,8 125,2 137,9 
Japan 174,9 167,7 159,5 151,8 134,6 108,4 116,5 112,4 109,2 106,2 
Total 550,2 619,9 594,5 580,3 560,3 544,89 532,8 510,3 503,1 504,9 
 
 
Appendix 1B: Cigarette volume, by region (billions): 
 
BAT cigarette volume           
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Europe  245 254                 
Asia-Pacific 145 153 185 188 191 188 197 197 198 196 
Latin America 151 147                 
Africa and Middle East 101 120 127 124             
America-Pacific 42 41                 
Western Europe     130 119 135 129 119 112 112 120 
Eastern Europe     131 128             
Americas      151 149 143 142 134 131 124 113 
EEMEA         236 235 226 227 229 236 
Total 684 715 724 708 705 694 676 667 663 665 
 
PMI cigarette volume           
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
EU 258 244 235,3 223 211,493 198 185,1 185,197 194,589 193,586 
EEMEA 290 303 298,7 289,3 290,25 303,8 296,5 287,923 279,411 271,393 
Asia 212 224 226,2 282,3 313,282 326,6 301,3 288,128 281,35 260,029 
Latin America & 
Canada 89 99 103,8 105,3 100,241 98,6 97,3 94,7006 91,92 87,938 
Total 849 870 864 899,9 915,266 927 880,2 855,9486 847,27 812,946 
 
 
 
